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Two points are here to be noted. First, that a people deceived by a false show of advantage 
will often labour for its own destruction; and, unless convinced by someone whom it trusts, 
that the course on which it is bent is pernicious, and that some other is to be preferred, will 
bring infinite danger and injury upon the State. And should it so happen, as sometimes is the 
case, that from having been deceived before, either by men or by events, there is none in 
whom the people trust, their ruin is inevitable. 
Discourses on the first decade of Titus Livius, chapter LIII  
Niccolò Machiavelli 
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Summary 
This thesis investigates political budget cycles (PBC) in a modern democracy. A model of 
PBC in a small, open economy is developed using the New-Keynesian methodology, 
incorporating separate fiscal and monetary authorities. The model is based on that the 
competence of the politicians cannot be directly observed, and that the interest rate is a 
variable of high visibility for consumers.  
The model predicts that if there are no constraints to the central bank in the form of nominal 
limits to the exchange rate, there will be no PBC.  
An empirical analysis tests the model predictions on a panel data set of 141 countries over 
the years 1990-2009, and finds that they have good support.  
The lesson that can be drawn from this thesis is that an independent central bank is not by 
itself a hindrance to PBC. An independent central bank will only be an institutional 
constraint to politicians if there are no constraints that bind the central bank.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Political budget cycles (PBC) have been studied by economists for decades, and are in 
general understood as expansive fiscal policies in election years that should help the 
incumbent politician to get re-elected. There are several reasons for why PBC is an 
interesting topic. First, PBC has implications for a number of economic variables; there are 
the direct effects on fiscal variables, but macroeconomic variables such as production and 
inflation will also be affected by the PBC. Second, the PBC are a product of interactions 
between politicians, the electorate and institutions such as the central bank. Thus, 
understanding the PBC will give greater understanding of how a country works; both as a 
democracy and as an economy. 
The research on political budget cycles have tried to identify which factors that influences 
these cycles, and in which countries and in which time periods political budget cycles are 
present. The findings of recent articles (Hagen (2010), Alt and Lassen (2006),  Shi and 
Svennson (2006)) is that cycles are found in both developed and developing countries, and 
that factors such as access to information and political polarization are important 
determinants of the size of the cycles.  
Clark and Hallerberg (2000) lays out a model which concludes that capital controls, central 
bank independence and the type of exchange rate regime are crucial determinants for 
political budget cycles. A brief empirical investigation supported these findings. However, 
the ideas brought forward in this paper seem not to have gained ground.  
Several authors (Drazen (2001a), Clark and Hallerberg (2000), Leith and Wren-Lewis 
(2009)) points out that there is a need for improving the existing models of political business 
cycles. As will be discussed in detail later on, all of the existing modelling of political 
business cycles can be subjected to one or more of the following points of critique; i: the 
model is not micro founded, or ii: the model abstracts from the independent central bank, or 
iii: the model keeps production and inflation exogenously fixed. 
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This thesis addresses all three point of critique. This is done by developing a small, open 
economy model using the New-Keynesian methodology. Further, separate fiscal and 
monetary authorities are included, where it is assumed that the central bank is independent.  
1.2 Research Question 
The research question that this master thesis aims to answer is the following:  
How does an independent central bank and various exchange rate targeting regimes affect 
the political budget cycles? 
The perspective taken in this thesis is a stylized country that is both a modern democracy and 
a small, open economy. The following sections define in detail what is meant by both the 
research question and the perspective of the thesis.  
This thesis builds on the work in Clark and Hallerberg (2000). However, contrary to this 
article, this thesis will discuss independent central banks only. The reason for this is that 
there has been a long trend towards more central bank independence (Arnone et al 2006).  
An independent central bank is therefore a feature consistent with the case of a modern 
democracy, which is the baseline case this thesis sets out to investigate.  
Clark and Hallerberg (2000) discuss the effect of capital controls. The focus of this thesis is 
the small, open economy, with corresponding full capital mobility. Thus, capital controls and 
the closed economy case will not be discussed in this thesis.  
Yet another limitation of this thesis is that it discusses opportunistic politicians only – an 
alternative would be to write about partisan politics. The choice of focus is not arbitrary as 
the research question deals with the interaction between voters, politicians and the 
independent central bank. Therefore, heterogeneous politicians are left out to allow for a 
thorough treatment of the factors most relevant to the research question.   
Finally, it should be stressed that the underlying focus of this paper is positive. The thesis 
aims to understand how the political budget cycles work, hence normative questions and 
policy implications are relegated to section 5 and 6.  
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1.3 Structure and Methods 
Section 2 will provide the reader with some the most important developments with respect to 
the topic of opportunistic political business cycles.  
Section 3 develops a model of political budget cycles in a small, open economy. The model 
is micro-founded, incorporates separate monetary and fiscal authorities and it models output 
and inflation using the recent New-Keynesian methodology. The model results in theoretical 
predictions that can be empirically tested. Further, the model is simulated, demonstrating the 
effects of the political budget cycle on government expenditures, production and inflation.  
The empirical analysis can be found in section 4. The analysis is performed on a panel data 
set of over 2 600 observations, where the sample period extends from 1990 to 2009, and 
covers 141 countries. The baseline results are that political budget cycles are found in 
countries with a fixed or “semi fixed” exchange rate, whereas the budget cycles are not 
found when the exchange rate is independently floating. Also, it is shown that the magnitude 
of the budget cycles depend on both access to information and corruption, conditional on the 
exchange rate regime allowing for budget cycles. Finally, the empirical section explores the 
dynamics of the PBC, by examining the changes in government expenditures before, during 
and after elections. It is found that the increase in spending is not restricted to the election 
year, and further that there appears to be different dynamics in countries with different 
exchange rate regimes.  
Section 5 will discuss the findings of the thesis, and section 6 concludes.  
1.4 Definitions 
A political budget cycle is cyclical movement in fiscal policies, which is found in 
conjunction with elections. In general, the budget cycle indicates that fiscal policies will be 
expansionary in the election year. However, the political budget cycle could also be defined 
by its cause. Given the focus on opportunistic PBC, an inherent feature of the concept of 
PBC lies in its motivation, as the objective of the political budget cycles is to improve the re-
election probability of the incumbent. Thus, the term political budget cycles as it is used in 
this thesis refer to both of these aspects; it is an expansive fiscal policy in the election year, 
the objective of which is to improve the re-election probability of the incumbent.  
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A slightly different term is political business cycles. Rather than pointing at any economic 
policy instrument, the term points at the effect of an expansionary policy in conjunction with 
an election; a change in the business cycle. It could also be used more generally as 
“...political determinants of macroeconomic cycles” (Drazen 2001a:75). In any case, the 
term can be used both for expansionary monetary and fiscal policies in or around election 
years. It should then be noted that the term political budget cycle is more precise than 
political business cycles. The focus of this thesis is on political budget cycles. 
Opportunistic politicians can be defined as being “...purely self-interested: they care about 
being in office per se, or about the rents they receive. They choose policy so as to further 
these goals, but otherwise do not care about what policy is implemented” (Persson and 
Tabellini 2000:11). This is the definition that will be utilized in this thesis.  
The baseline case in this thesis is a country that is both a modern democracy and a small, 
open economy. As the political science aspect is not the main focus of this thesis, the term 
“modern democracy” refers to a country that has the following two features: i: it chooses its 
leaders through elections, and ii: it has an independent central bank. Hence, the term 
“modern” refers to the institution of an independent central bank. The term “small, open 
economy” refers to a country that has no restrictions on the flows of goods and capital across 
its borders. Also, the country is so small that domestic production, prices and policies has no 
impact on the rest of the world. 
Throughout this paper, the definition of central bank independence proposed by Fischer and 
Debelle (1994) which they called Instrument Independence is utilized. By this, it is meant 
that it is the politicians who set the goals for the monetary policy (e.g. an inflation target), 
and the central bank who determines how to reach those goals (setting the interest rate, credit 
limits etc). As Alesina et al points out: “this is a rather “minimalist” view of the meaning of 
central bank independence”. (2010:15). However, the results in this thesis will be just as 
valid for countries with central bank goal independence, i.e. that the central bank decides on 
the goals for the monetary policy, in addition to central bank instrument independence. 
Hence, this wide definition of central bank independence increases the relevance of the 
results in this thesis.  
Throughout, this thesis considers institutions as “constitutional”, i.e. that they are not 
subject to change in the short run. Such institutions could be the organisation of the central 
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bank, the exchange rate regime, election processes etc. This paper will extensively discuss 
how such institutional features will affect political business cycles, but abstracts from any 
possible feedback from the political budget cycles to the institutions themselves. Such a 
procedure is common in political economy, and allow for giving the research question a 
thorough treatment. However, the empirical section does to some extent control for this, by 
running regressions conditional on e.g. the central bank being independent. The exchange 
rate regime is considered constitutional as well. Blomberg et al (2005) provides a discussion 
on the impact of elections on the exchange rate regime, although the arguments presented in 
this paper is mostly relevant for countries without an independent central bank. This thesis 
does not pursue the topic of non-constitutional exchange rate regimes any further.  
1.5 Summary of model 
In order to motivate the derivations in sections 2 and 3, this part will briefly discuss the 
highlights of the model which will be laid out in section 3. As already stated, the perspective 
of the model is on a country that is both a small, open economy and a modern democracy. 
The model is a micro-founded model of political budget cycles that is developed using the 
New-Keynesian methodology, incorporating separate fiscal and monetary authorities.  
The model is based on that the competence of politicians is changing over time, and that it 
cannot be directly observed by consumers. Consumers can at their leisure calculate the 
competence of the incumbent politician using observed prices and production levels, but that 
is assumed to give them disutility. However, if the central bank changes the interest rate in 
response to government spending, consumers can costlessly use the observed interest rate to 
learn of the governments dealings and thereby learn the competence of the incumbent.  
The sequence of events is such that politicians move first by deciding on public expenditures 
and debt. This is followed by the central bank which decides on the interest rate. Thereafter 
consumers make their consumption and labour supply decisions and firms decide on prices. 
Elections are held biannually.  
The model predicts that if the central bank follows a Taylor-type loss function, the central 
bank will respond to increased government spending by increasing the interest rate. Thus, 
consumers will observe the interest rate response to government expenditures, and learn if 
the incumbent uses fiscal policies to try to improve the re-election probability. The model 
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predicts that in this case, voters will not be more likely to vote for the incumbent if an 
expansionary fiscal policy is undertaken. Therefore, the incumbent will not carry out an 
expansive fiscal policy in the election year as it will not improve the probability of re-
election.  
If on the other hand the central bank follows an exchange rate target, the central bank will 
not adjust its interest rate in response to domestic macroeconomic variables such as inflation, 
production, and hence government spending. In this case consumers cannot learn anything 
from the central banks response, leaving some room for the incumbent politician to try to 
manipulate the electorate through fiscal policies. The model predicts that with an exchange 
rate peg, or nominal limits to the exchange rate, political budget cycles will be the 
equilibrium policy.   
The main contributions of section 3 are therefore to i: merge a model of PBC that assumes 
voters are rational with micro founded macroeconomic modelling, and ii: include the 
independent central bank in the analysis, and iii: explicitly model various central targeting 
regimes. Finally, the model is used to confirm some earlier findings of that access to 
information and corruption are important determinants of the magnitude of the budget 
cycles.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theory  
Different sources are attributed as the genesis of the analytical modelling of political 
business cycles
1
, however, Nordhaus (1975) is a definitely a milestone in this respect. The 
Nordhaus model is essentially built around four equations 
First, the Philips curve demonstrates the tradeoff between output and inflation:  
     
       
        
Here    is the output gap,   is inflation and    is expected inflation. Second, voters have 
preferences over output and inflation, given by the following loss-function:  
    
      
     
 
 
 
 
      
  
 
       
Here    and   are the desired levels of the output gap and inflation, and   is a positive 
constant. When voters are to decide who they will vote for, they assess the economic 
performance since the last election. However, voters forget events in the past. When they are 
to determine whether to vote for the incumbent or not, they sum up the “memory 
discounted” losses from the last election up until the present. The number of votes the 
incumbent receives,   , is given by: 
       
     
 
   
           
Here       is the forgetfulness factor,         and elections are held every T+1 
years.     is a stochastic, zero-mean term.  
The final part of the Nordhaus model is the formation of expectations. The model assumes 
voters form expectations based on the following equation:  
                                                 
1 Some attribute this to Michal Kalecki (1943), although these political business cycles were not related to elections. 
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The parameter   determines how fast expectations adapts to inflation in the preceding 
period. The key element here is that the both expected inflation and voting behaviour is 
exclusively backward looking.  
Rational expectations means that the expected difference between the expected and realised 
value is zero, i.e. that one should not expect there to be a difference between expected 
inflation and realised inflation. This implies that the expectations should be forward looking. 
This is not the case here, as the expectations are formed on the basis of past and 
contemporaneous events only – thus a key feature of the Nordhaus model is that the inflation 
expectation is not rational.  
As politicians are assumed to control monetary policy and want to maximise their re-election 
probability, the model can be solved by maximising   with respect to   ,     ...   , where 
S is time of the next election and t is the current period. Given that the politician has just 
been elected, the solution is a cycle where the incumbent politician keeps inflation and 
production low after the election, in order to lower the expected inflation. Immediately 
before the election the politicians initiate a boom, allowing both high production and low 
inflation in the election year.  
Drazen (2001a) lists three points of critique that can be held against the Nordhaus-model. 
First, the assumption that politicians control monetary policy is unrealistic. Second, voters 
are not rational, which is visible both through their inflation expectations and voting 
behaviour. Third, he “...questions the central role assigned to moving along the Philips 
curve to reduce unemployment via inflation surprises” (Drazen 2001a:81). Also, he notes 
that the model abstracts from all fiscal policy instruments.  
A great improvement of the Nordhaus model came in Rogoff (1990) and Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988). Voters in these models are rational, and the mechanism that drives the cycles is 
asymmetric information. Rogoff (1990) assumes that the politicians observe their own 
performance in providing public goods before the voters. Also, performance is assumed to 
be positively correlated over time, hence the current performance of a politician can be 
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useful in forecasting future performance. So, the incumbent politician will wish to signal that 
he is competent before the election.  
In Rogoff (1990), only fiscal instruments are available to politicians. Rogoff shows in his 
article under some mild assumptions there exists a separating equilibrium only, and therefore 
voters are able to infer the incumbent’s competence level by observing the level of 
government spending. Also, it is shown that the magnitude of the cycles will depend on the 
rents enjoyed by the politician from remaining in office.  
Shi and Svennson (2006) modified the model by Rogoff (1990). This new model is simpler 
in that all types of politicians have an incentive to run a deficit in election years, even those 
that are less competent. Also, Shi and Svennson (2006) shows that the magnitude of the 
budget cycles depend on the electorate’s ability to obtain information on fiscal policies.  
Drazen proposes an alternative model that augments Rogoff by adding a separate monetary 
authority (2001a, 2001b). The model is labelled the “Active fiscal – passive monetary”-
model. The politicians, who control fiscal policies, are opportunistic and wish to remain in 
office. The central bank targets a Taylor-type loss function with the properties that it i: 
assign more weight to deviations from the inflation target compared to the average voter, and 
ii: have lower inflation and production targets compared to the average voter. Also, money 
growth is assumed to be unobserved, implying that voters cannot use the observed interest 
rate to learn the incumbent politicians’ competence level.  
The probability of getting re-elected is assumed to depend on two factors. First, there is a 
mechanism of targeted public spending, corresponding to the mechanism described in 
Rogoff (1990). Second, the probability will also depend on the general state of the economy. 
The foundation for the “state of the economy” argument is empirical, where it is referred to 
the findings of e.g. Fair (1978). The timing of events is important for the model outcome, in 
that the politicians move first, and the central bank responds to the politicians’ actions.  
As in Rogoff (1990), there exists a separating equilibrium where the competent politicians 
will signal their competence. However, the central bank will wish to offset the demand shock 
associated with increased government spending. As the central bank is assumed to be more 
conservative with respect to inflation compared to voters, the politician will pressure the 
central bank to undertake a more accommodating monetary policy. This would lead to 
increased production and would improve the probability of getting re-elected.  
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The Active Fiscal – Passive Monetary-model is most interesting in that it explores the 
interaction between the fiscal and monetary authority. However, there are some arguments 
against it. First, is the lack of micro-foundation; the assumption that an improved state of the 
economy will improve the re-election probability is based on empirical evidence only. So, 
even though it may be true the model does not help in explaining why this is so. Also, as 
there has been a trend towards more central bank independence (Arnone et al (2006), the 
relevance of a model relying on the assumption of an accommodating central bank is 
questionable.  
Clark and Hallerberg (2000) use the Mundell (1963) - Fleming (1962) framework to discuss 
the topic of political business cycles. First, they impose that the incumbent politician will 
prefer a higher output in election years. Thereafter, they solve the model for six different 
cases depending on three institutional features; whether the central bank is independent, 
whether there is capital mobility and whether exchange rates are fixed of flexible. The 
findings from the model is summed up in table 2.1 (The closed economy results are omitted). 
 
Central Bank 
Independence 
No Central 
Bank 
Independence 
Fixed 
Exchange 
Rates 
Fiscal Cycles, 
No Monetary 
Cycles 
Fiscal Cycles, 
No Monetary 
Cycles 
Floating 
Exchange 
rates 
No Fiscal or 
Monetary 
Cycles 
Monetary 
Cycles, No 
Fiscal Cycles 
Table 2.1 (Clark and Hallerberg 2000:330) 
A result of the Mundell-Fleming framework is that if the exchange rate is fixed, there is no 
room for any cycles in monetary policy. This is because the monetary policy will be 
“occupied” maintaining the exchange rate, leaving no room for pursuing alternate goals. 
Hence, given that the exchange rate is fixed it is unimportant whether the central bank is 
independent or not; there will not be cycles in the monetary policies in either case
2
. The only 
possible way to increase output is through an expansionary fiscal policy, so this will be the 
solution in both “fixed exchange rate” cases.  
                                                 
2 This result abstracts from issues relating to the credibility of the exchange rate peg – i.e. it is assumed that even in the 
presence of a non-independent central bank, the exchange rate peg is credible.  
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Another result of the Mundell-Fleming framework is that if the exchange rate is allowed to 
float freely, government expenditures have no impact on total production. This is because 
increased government spending will cause domestic interests rates to increase, which will 
cause capital inflow and an appreciation of the exchange rate and hence a reduction of 
exports. This reaction is assumed to be instantaneous. Thus, in order to improve output 
politicians will have to use monetary policies. If the exchange rate is flexible and the central 
bank is independent, there are no cycles at all; government expenditures have no effect on 
output, and the central bank cannot be forced to change its policies. If however the central 
bank is not independent, the model predicts an expansionary monetary policy in the election 
year.  
The Clark and Hallerberg (2000) model reach some very clear cut results, and introduce the 
idea that not only central bank independence but also the exchange rate regime matters for 
the PBC. However, the model has a clear drawback in that it completely abstracts from 
micro-foundations both with respect to voters assessment of political candidates, and the 
macro-framework.   
To conclude, there are some gaps in the modelling of PBC. There are micro-founded models, 
models that include the central bank, and models that assume rational voters. However, there 
has not been constructed a model that includes all of these features.  
Finally, note that this section has dealt with some of the most important theoretical 
contributions to opportunistic political budget cycles. However, there are models based on 
e.g. partisan politics or intra-governmental arguing that aim to explain political budget 
cycles. This will not be a subject for discussion in this thesis.  
2.2 Empirics 
There has been published numerous articles on political business cycles, so this section will 
only go through some of the most recent findings. Some econometric challenges in 
implementing the model are discussed in section 4. 
One of the empirical studies of political budget cycles is found in Brender and Drazen 
(2005). Using a panel data set over 106 countries over the period 1960 to 2001, they find 
budget cycles in a cross section of all democracies. However, when they remove the so-
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called “new democracies” from the sample the budget cycle disappear. Hence, they conclude 
that budget cycle is a phenomenon associated with inexperienced democracies, and provide 
lack of information and lack of democratic experience compared to established democracies 
as possible explanations for their finding.  
Shi and Svensson (2006) use a data set over 85 countries covering the years 1975 to 1995. 
Their conclusion was similar to that of Brender and Drazen (2005), as they find that the 
cycles are larger in developing countries. Also, they show that access to information and 
corruption are important determinants for the magnitude of the budget cycles. 
Hagen (2010) and Alt and Lassen (2006) test for budget cycles using similar data sets over 
OECD-economies from the 1990’s and onwards. Both papers find significant budget cycles, 
even when controlling for “new democracies”. Thus, it seems clear that budget cycles is not 
a phenomenon relevant for new democracies only.  
There have been a few attempts at testing the propositions from Clark and Hallerberg (2000). 
The same article provides an empirical analysis on a small samples consisting of EU- and 
OECD countries around the 1980’s. The model predictions have in general support, both 
with respect to monetary and fiscal policies. It is found cycles in monetary policy in 
countries with low central bank independence and flexible exchange rates. There is no trace 
of a monetary cycle in the cases where either the central bank is independent or the exchange 
rate is fixed. Also, the article finds traces of cycles in fiscal policies in the cases with fixed 
exchange rates, whereas the estimated cycle is small when the exchange rate is flexible.  
The hypotheses from Clark and Hallerberg (2000) has also been tested in other papers using 
smaller data sets over Brazil (Hiroi (2008)) and 33 developing countries between 1977 to 
2001 (Hall (2008)). The predictions from the Clark and Hallerberg model are in general 
supported.  
This section has briefly reviewed some of the empirical contributions to the research on 
political budget cycles. There exists a vast literature on PBC in general, so the selection here 
is by no means exhaustive. Drazen (2001a) reviews the literature on PBC up until 2000.  
Section 3 will now proceed by building a model of PBC, where an important part of the 
model will be the New Keynesian macroeconomic modeling. However, as the main focus of 
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this thesis is political economy, this thesis does not review the literature on macroeconomics. 
Woodford (2003) provides a textbook approach to New-Keynesian modeling.  
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3. The model 
3.1 Introduction: Model setup and assumptions 
In order to answer the research question through building a model, the model by Shi and 
Svennson (2006) is a natural starting point. This is because it is a micro-founded model of 
opportunistic PBC, whereas it abstracts from some of the more fine points made in e.g. 
Rogoff (1990) about separating equilibria. The consequence of using a model that has a 
pooling equilibrium is firstly that it simplifies the model substantially, and secondly that 
there is no gain from the cycles in the sense that it helps voters choose competent leaders. 
This is because all types of politicians, regardless of competence, will follow the same 
strategy.  
The contribution of this thesis is to fill a gap in the literature by building a model of PBC 
that is micro-founded and includes the independent central bank. However, the independent 
central bank reacts to macroeconomic variables such as production, inflation and possibly 
exchange rates. In order to be able to describe the central banks reactions it is necessary to 
explain how variables are affected by the political game between the monetary and fiscal 
authorities. Augmenting the model by including the central bank thus necessitates 
endogenizing production and inflation. 
 Gali and Monacelli (2005) lay out a New Keynesian macroeconomic model for a small, 
open economy. This is a modern macroeconomic model, but does not include the public 
sector. In an extension of Gali and Monacelli (2005), Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005) derive a 
model that includes not only the public sector, but also other factors such as sticky nominal 
wages. The model in this thesis is built on the model laid out in Leith and Wren-Lewis 
(2005). It is however simplified by removing both sticky wages and the distortionary fiscal 
instruments: sticky wages will not qualitatively add anything to the model, and a multitude 
of fiscal instruments goes beyond what the competence model of PBC from Shi and 
Svennson (2006) can utilize. Also, the only shocks in the model are those that affect the 
politicians’ competence. A richer model than the one developed here could introduce shocks 
to costs, demand etc, but that is unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Upon starting the work of building the model, it became apparent that the consumers are 
treated quite differently in models of political economy and modern macroeconomics. 
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Although consumers are assumed to be rational, in the sense that they are forward looking, 
in both types of models, models of political economy place restrictions on which variables 
the consumers are able to observe, and each period is a sequence of events taking place in a 
specified order. So, in order to build a functioning model with these building blocks a 
number of assumptions and innovations are needed. 
The following section briefly discusses the main components of the model, and how these 
are modelled.  
The government 
In the model, a distinction is made between government production and consumption. 
Government consumption is simply the amount of goods purchased by the public sector each 
period. Government production on the other hand consists of the sum of two parts; public 
consumption and the competence of the incumbent politician. The objective of the public 
sector is to provide the consumers with goods they would otherwise not be able to obtain, at 
least not as efficiently. Examples of such goods are territorial defence and policing. In its 
production of these goods the public sector will consume regular consumer goods, but still 
there is a clear distinction between public consumption and public production. Further, 
public goods can be provided with varying degrees of efficiency. The model assumes that 
the competence of the incumbent politician will determine the effectiveness of the public 
sector. Competence takes the form of a moving average process, which is standard in these 
applications. The interpretation of this is similar to that found in Shi and Svennson (2006), 
e.g. that “circumstances change over time and a policy-maker that is competent in some 
tasks need not be competent in other tasks in other periods” (Shi & Svennson 2006:1376) 
Taxes are assumed to be fixed indefinitely. This is similar, but not quite equivalent to Shi 
and Svennson (2006), who used log-linear utility from private and public goods that allowed 
taxes to be fixed and hence reduce the remaining number of fiscal variables that are to be 
determined to two. However, this “trick” is not applicable in a setup where consumers are 
not liquidity constraint and determine by themselves the consumption path of their wealth. 
Thus, what remains is the not as attractive option of simply fixing taxes per assumption. 
There is empirical evidence of that taxes are an important part of PBC (Brender and Drazen 
(2005)), therefore, augmenting the model further by allowing for endogenous determination 
of taxes as well would be a most interesting extension. However, this goes beyond the scope 
of this master thesis.  
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Politicians 
Politicians are assumed to derive utility from remaining in office only. Such rents need not 
be pecuniary, but could be the status associated with being the executive of a country. 
Abstracting from that politicians may derive utility from factors such as income, labour 
supply and so on is a simplification, and is discussed further in the text. It turns out it is does 
not affect the qualitative results of the model significantly. It will, however, simplify the 
model greatly.  
The Central Bank 
To support the positive focus of this thesis, the objective function of the central bank that 
will be incorporated in the model should have some resemblance to its counterparty in the 
real world. In that respect, the International Monetary Fund has published classifications 
over various types of exchange rate regimes. The three main types of regimes are exchange 
rate targeting, inflation targeting and monetary aggregate targeting. However, in the most 
recent classification as of April 31 2008, no OECD countries follow a monetary aggregate 
target. Thus, the two types of regimes that are consistent with the modern democracy focus 
in this thesis are exchange rate and inflation targeting.  
It is evident from IMF’s classification of de facto exchange rate regimes that exchange rate 
targeting and inflation targeting are not necessarily mutually exclusive regimes, as there are 
countries that both have an inflation target and to some extent interfere in the exchange rate 
market. This thesis therefore presents the central banks objective function in a unified 
manner that can be used to cover both the case of an exchange rate target and an inflation 
target. The central bank is assumed to be targeting a Taylor-type loss function, consisting of 
the sum of squared divergence from the inflation and output targets. The side constraints are 
the demand and supply equations of the economy, the IS- and Philips – curves. So far, the 
optimisation problem is quite standard. However, there are two more side constraints, in the 
form of inequalities that govern the upper and lower permissible limit for the nominal 
exchange rate.  
Dependent on the numerical values of the nominal exchange rate limits, the central bank’s 
objective function that is adopted in this thesis can be used to model i: an inflation target, ii: 
an exchange rate peg, or finally iii: an intermediary regime where there is a gap between the 
upper and lower nominal exchange rate limit.  
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It should be stressed again that the focus of this thesis if positive, and considers institutional 
features as constitutional. This implies that this thesis will discuss neither which monetary 
regime that will maximise consumer welfare, nor will it discuss why some countries choose 
a particular type of monetary regime. A second implication is that the monetary regime is 
assumed to be given to the central bank through the constitution or a similar device. Thus, it 
is assumed that the monetary regime is not subject to change.  
A simplifying solution is chosen with respect to the central banks optimisation problem. The 
Taylor loss function is assumed to contain the domestic producer price inflation, as opposed 
to consumer price inflation. The benefit of this approach is both that it simplifies the model, 
but also that it allows for a purebred inflation target regime where the central bank does not 
respond to exchange rate movements.  
Consumers 
The most fundamental assumption of this model, of which the entire conclusion hinges, 
comes from on to what extent various variables are observable for the consumers. Shi and 
Svennson (2006) assume that a fixed share of the population that cannot observe i: the 
competence level of the incumbent and ii: the debt level of the government. However, a 
change in government consumption will in general lead to changes in a number of 
macroeconomic variables that are observable for the consumers such as the price level, 
wages and so on. Thus, the assumption that a fixed proportion of the population is unable to 
distinguish between fiscal expansionary policies and a highly competent politician seem 
questionable.  
The solution adopted in this thesis is to introduce the idea of costly inference in terms of 
utility. In the model, consumers can directly observe all variables in the economy, except the 
competence level of the incumbent, and the current public debt level. However, the 
consumers can at their leisure calculate these variables, but that will reduce their utility. At 
the beginning of each period, voters form a belief of how much debt they think will be issued 
by the public sector. If the important macroeconomic variables pan out about as expected, 
consumers retain their beliefs. If, however, there is a large divergence between their beliefs 
and he realised economic outcome then the beliefs are recalculated again. So, in the model 
presented in this paper, the inobservant share of the population is endogenous.  
 25 
The interest rate is given special treatment. If the central bank adjusts its interest rate in 
response to altered government spending, all consumers are assumed to recalculate their 
beliefs, setting the inobservant share of the population to zero. There are several arguments 
for why this could be an appropriate assumption:.  
 In the model, the domestic interest rate is one single variable that is highly visible 
and most important for consumers both through their intertemporal consumption 
decisions and their wealth. Other macroeconomic variables, such as production and 
inflation, are aggregates. This is an argument for that if inference is costly it should 
be less costly if based on the interest rate.  
 In reality, only a very small fraction of prices are directly observed by voters through 
their own purchases, and the inflation and production indexes that can be observed by 
the voters may not fully capture the effects of altered government spending. Also, the 
composition of government spending may be subject to change, making it even 
harder to use production and prices to learn of the governments dealings. 
 Production and inflation is continually changing, whereas the discount rate target 
usually only changes at fixed intervals weeks or months apart. Thus, consumers 
should be more attentive to the interest rate decisions compared to the continuous 
changes to other macroeconomic variables.  
 There is a lag from when a change in both fiscal and monetary policy takes place, 
until the effect is visible on macroeconomic variables. Thus, identifying e.g. a 
contemporaneous expansionary fiscal policy by observing current inflation is likely 
to be difficult. However, the central bank will try to anticipate the movements in 
inflation, and will then adjust its interest rate before the increase in inflation takes 
place.  
It is vital to point out that this assumption says nothing about what monetary policy the 
consumers expect – it is irrelevant whether the central bank is very open about the monetary 
policy it plans to undertake or not. This means that the assumption is as valid for both 
extremes such as Norges Bank as Bank of Japan. It is more important that the central bank 
explains why the policy it has already employed is followed.   
Sequence of events 
The timing of events is quite crucial in this model, and the following sequence of events 
takes place every period: 
 Politicians decide on the debt level, and the consumers’ beliefs are formed.  
 There is a shock to the politicians competence level 
 The central bank sets the interest rate 
 Consumers and firms optimize their behavior 
 Every other year, an election is held 
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Decisions regarding public spending and debt are usually undertaken once or twice a year, 
whereas actions by the central bank are far more frequent. The central bank will therefore 
respond to the decisions regarding fiscal policies. Consumers and firms can revise their 
economic decisions at their leisure, so they should move after the central bank. The second 
point, the shock to the incumbent’s competence level, will be developed further later on. 
Suffice it to say politicians cannot with certainty know how well they will perform in the 
coming period. Finally, voters use all information available at the election date, so the 
election is the last event. Elections are held biannually.  
Capital Markets 
The model will throughout assume complete capital markets. Also, the model abstracts from 
risk premia and does not use a strict No-Ponzi condition when discussing government debt. 
The reason for this is first and foremost that the focus of this thesis is on the short term 
cycles in fiscal policies. Thus, fiscal sustainability and hence risk premia are not the main 
points of interest in this thesis.  
However, as will be further motivated in section 4 and 5, the effect of the cycles on fiscal 
sustainability is a topic that should be examined further. This is unfortunately beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  
Section 3.2 will proceed in solving the model by backwards induction. First out is step 4, the 
actions by firms and consumers. Thereafter, step 3, the response by the central bank is 
analysed. Finally, the actions by the politicians are determined.  
The model takes as much as possible “off the shelf” from its two sources Leith and Wren-
Lewis (2005) and Shi and Svennson (2006). I have throughout taken care to explicitly write 
what I have added to the models, however, the exposition may be too parsimonious in the 
cases where the original models have been left unchanged. Thus, if the reader wishes to redo 
all calculations, additional details can be found in the original sources. 
3.2  The model 
3.2.1 Consumers 
A list of all variables and their definitions can be found in appendix 1.  
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There is a continuum of consumers, of size one. The objective function for a consumer is 
given by: 
    
           
  
   
   
      
 
   
      
The utility of consumers depends on consumption, C, public services provided   , labour 
supply N, and the utility derived from having a particular candidate in office. Here    is a 
parameter that differs between voters, which captures the heterogeneity of voter preferences. 
   is a binary variable that can take the values -0.5 or 0.5, depending on whether candidate a 
or b is in office, respectively.    is uniformly distributed along [-0.5, 0.5].   is the subjective 
discount factor for utility   is a labour supply parameter.  
The consumers’ budget constraint is given by: 
                 
 
 
                 
 
 
    
 
 
               
                   
     is the price of the domestically produced consumption good j, whereas       is the 
price of consumption good j produced in country i. Some derivations and definitions 
regarding exchange rates and prices are found in appendix 3.       is the consumption of 
domestically produced consumption good j, and       is the consumption of consumption 
good j produced in country i.   is profits that are received from the households ownership in 
firms. D is the nominal value of the portfolio that is held by the consumer, and Q is the 
discount factor. T is the fixed lump sum tax. W is wage per labour supply unit.   
Appendix 2 shows that the budget constraint (3.2) can be rewritten to the following:  
                                      
Optimising (3.1) subject to (3.3) with respect to C and D yields the following: 
 
    
  
    
  
             
Defining Rt   1/EtQt,t.+1, (3.4) can be rewritten to: 
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Taking logs of (3.5) and rearranging gives: 
                             
Lowercase letters indicate the logarithm of the level variable, with the exception of    
   
 
 
 . Inflation is defined as           . The result in (3.4), (3.5) and (3.6) is that 
consumers wish to smooth consumption over time, adjusted for that the real interest rate may 
differ from the consumer’s time preference so there may be consumption tilting.  
3.2.2 Government Consumption 
Public consumption is assumed to be spent on domestically produced products only. 
Minimizing the total costs of government consumption gives the following public demand 
for good j: 
      
     
  
 
  
       
  is the elasticity of substitution between domestically produced goods, and is equal to that 
of the consumers. G is aggregate public consumption.  
3.2.3 Firms  
Production for firm j is given by: 
               
I.e. production is linear in labour supply. The demand for firm j is given by 
      
     
  
 
  
      
  
  
   
    
   
  
  
 
 
         
  is a measure of home bias in consumption,    is the bilateral nominal exchange rate with 
country i,   
  is an index of domestic prices in country i, and    is an index of domestic 
prices associated with domestic consumption of domestically produced goods. (3.9) can be 
rewritten to: 
 29 
      
     
  
 
  
        
Where         
   
   
 
 
 
 
   
 is aggregate domestic production.  
The objective function of the firm is: 
     
 
       
      
    
        
           
    
 
 
   
       
Using Calvo-type sticky prices, 1-    is the probability that the firm will be able to adjust its 
prices each period. The model so far follows the standard derivation of New-Keynesian 
models. (3.11) can, together with (3.4) be used to derive the New-Keynesian Philips curve: 
                                
mc is the log of the real wage, w-pH, and   is the steady state markup over marginal cost. 
  
             
  
 is a battery of parameters.    is the rate of inflation in   . 
3.2.4 Preliminary summary 
Appendix 4 shows that the demand side of this model can be expressed as the following IS-
curve: 
                                             
As before, lowercase letters indicates logarithms of level variables. An important exception 
is g -ln(1-G/Y). 
 On the supply side, appendix 5 explains how (3.12) can be rewritten to 
                                         
    is the steady state markup in the domestic labour market.  
The outcome of step 4 of the model will be determined by the IS- and PC-curves. The next 
part will deal with step 3; the central banks response.  
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3.2.5 The Central Bank 
First, define the gap variable with respect to output as:  
              
   is the level of output that would occur in the absence of sticky prices.  
The central bank’s optimization problem is assumed to be given by the constitution or a 
similar legal device. The loss function of the central bank takes the form of quadratic 
deviations from the desired output and inflation targets: 
        
  
 
 
    
  
 
 
  
          
 
   
 
Here      is a parameter that determines the weight the central bank places on the output 
gap relative to inflation. Again, it should be pointed out that the inflation component of the 
loss function is domestic producer price inflation, and not consumer price inflation.  
The side constraints will be the demand (3.13) and supply (3.14) equations, but in addition 
there are constraints that limit the movement of the nominal exchange rate. The exchange 
rate constraints are inequalities that determine the upper and lower permissible values for the 
nominal exchange rate. These inequalities are included to allow for the possibility that the 
central bank may have been instructed to maintain some nominal target for the exchange 
rate. With a floating exchange rate regime, the nominal exchange rate will always be within 
these limits. With a fixed exchange rate, the limits will always be binding. A final possibility 
is that there is a narrow gap between the upper and lower nominal exchange rate limit, where 
it is not certain that the limits are binding. 
The model will at first study two corner solutions. The first is where the exchange rate is 
independently floating, and the second case is where the exchange rate is completely pegged. 
Later on it will be discussed how the model will work for countries with intermediary 
exchange rate regimes. Appendix 6 shows in detail how the central bank’s optimization 
problem is set up 
With these side constraints, using the domestic price inflation in the central bank’s loss 
function has the benefit of enabling the model to be solved for firstly a purebred inflation 
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targeting regime, and secondly an exchange rate peg regime. Including the consumer price 
inflation would cause the central bank to would also to respond to exchange rate changes, 
even when the exchange rate constraints are not binding.  
Case 1: Floating exchange rates  
Appendix 6 shows that in the case of floating exchange rates, the central bank sets the 
interest rate to achieve the following trade-off between output and inflation 
     
    
 
      
        
The central bank’s reaction function is derived from (3.17) in appendix 6. The central bank 
will change the interest rate in response to increased government spending according to the 
following: 
   
   
 
 
     
          
          
         
This implies that the central bank will respond to increased government spending by 
increasing the interest rate. This is as expected; increased government spending will 
stimulate the economy, thus increasing both inflation and production. So, in an attempt to 
cool down the economy and reach the desired trade-off between production and inflation, the 
central bank increases the interest rate. Increasing the interest rate has several effects; it 
makes it more beneficial to postpone consumption for consumers, and it causes appreciation 
of the exchange rate thus lowering the demand for domestic products. Both effects will 
reduce the demand.  
Case 2: Fixed exchange rates 
Following Gali and Monacelli (2005), complete financial markets and absence of risk premia 
implies that uncovered interest parity must hold:  
     
                  
Uncovered interest parity claims that the expected payoff from holding an asset denominated 
in the local currency for one period should be equal to buying foreign currency now, holding 
the asset denominated in the foreign currency for one period, and finally converting the asset 
into domestic currency.  
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The argument above implies that if there is a difference between the interest rate at home and 
abroad the exchange rate should be expected to change. The currency with a higher interest 
rate should expect a depreciation of a magnitude that would exactly cancel out the gain from 
investing at the higher interest rate. The mechanism is the opposite for countries with a lower 
interest rate. 
Assuming the exchange rate initially at its par value, with a credible fixed exchange rate 
regime the domestic interest rate is effectively pinned down to equal the foreign interest rate: 
     
        
This is as expected; the central bank has a passive role in economies that follows has a fixed 
exchange rate regime.  
If the model had been richer and included money as well, it would be natural to see some 
reaction from the central bank even if the exchange rate is pegged. Increased government 
spending would ceteris paribus increase the activity in the economy and hence increase 
demand for money. For a given money supply, the domestic interest rate would increase. 
Thus, in order to maintain (3.20) the central bank would have to increase the money supply. 
However, including money in the model would in not increase the qualitative results from 
the model, given that money growth would be assumed to be unobservable for consumers. 
Drazen (2001a) provides a discussion of such an assumption.  
 
3.2.6 Government budget constraint 
The government budget constraint is 
            
 
      
           
This states that government expenditures  should equal the sum of tax income, and the 
change in government debt. Here   denotes government debt.  
Section 3.1 introduced the concept of competence. Formally, the competence level of the 
politician j,   
 
, is defined by a moving average process where 
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Each   has a zero mean, finite variance distribution function F(   and a density function 
f( )where f(0)>0, and j is the identifier of the politician. As Shi and Svennson (2006), it is 
assumed that voters cannot observe   contemporaneously. However, they can observe the 
competence level of the previous period directly.  
The “government production”, of which voters receive utility, is defined as: 
       
  
 
    
 
      
 
      
       
 
    
       
The discussion in 3.1 explains why it is appropriate to distinguish between government 
production and consumption. The implication of including competence in the model as it is 
done in (3.23) is that the competence shocks are “nominal”, and are scaled according to the 
domestic production price index. This solution has the advantage of being analytically 
simple. However, if one moves many periods ahead in an economy with a positive inflation 
the shocks will eventually vanish. With the given setup with fixed nominal taxes, this 
problem is relevant for not just the competence part of the model.  The model thus seems 
most appropriately set up for analyzing a few periods ahead only.  
3.2.7 Politicians 
Politicians are assumed to have the following utility function:  
                   
 
   
       
   is a positive constant if the politician is in office in period t, and zero otherwise. (3.24) is 
a very simple utility function – it assumes that politicians’ only source of utility is to be in 
office. Contrary to e.g. Shi and Svennson (2006), they do not get any utility from 
consumption or from government output. 
There is a trade-off between augmenting the politicians’ utility function and specifying in 
detail how the inobservant consumers form their expectations. The solution adopted here is 
to use a fairly restrictive utility function of the politicians, which removes the need for 
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adjusting the IS and PC-curves to take into account how some consumers will e.g. 
underestimate public consumption in an election year. The alternative of adopting a richer 
utility function of the politicians would necessitate further assumptions on the behaviour of 
the inobservant consumers, and an adjustment of the IS and PC curves.  
Shi and Svennson (2006) incorporate politicians which derive utility both from the rents of 
remaining in office, but also from consumption and government expenditures. Even so, they 
find that budget cycles is the equilibrium solution. Thus, there should not be much lost by 
keeping (3.24) in such a simple form.  
There are two politicians, a and b, where a is the incumbent. To get elected, one must receive 
over half of the votes. As the main interest of this thesis is the interaction between voters, 
politicians and the independent central bank, it abstracts from partisan politics. Hence, there 
are no ideological differences between the two types of politicians.  
3.3 Budget Cycles 
This section will discuss the final part of the model; the actions by the politicians. The 
structure is as follows: First, the steady state is described in the case where there are no 
elections in section 3.3.1. It has been shown that the reaction by the central bank will be 
dependent on the exchange rate regime. Therefore, this section proceeds by solving the 
model for three types of exchange rate regimes; independently floating exchange rates 3.3.2, 
pegged exchange rates 3.3.3 and finally an intermediary exchange rate regime 3.3.4. Finally, 
the effect of corruption and information will be discussed in section 3.3.5.  
 
3.3.1 Case I: Steady state without elections.   
As the incumbent politician in a country without elections derive utility from remaining in 
office only, there is no reason for politicians to take up any debt or spend less than the 
government tax income, i.e:        . This is though a weak argument, as the politicians 
really do not have an incentive to do anything at all. Regardless, setting T=G is the intuitive 
solution, and as soon as the competence shock occurs government production will be 
determined. This competence shock will affect the amount of public services provided only, 
and not the domestic price level or production.  
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3.3.2 Case II: Elections and floating exchange rates 
Now, the incumbent politician will desire to get re-elected. Assume there is an off-election 
year at time t+1. As all variables are observable by the voters in hindsight, there is no 
incentive for the politicians to manipulate the voters. Note that                 
            . Moreover, the government will run a surplus to pay down any debt it is 
holding:  
      
  
 
      
       
 
      
       
Note that (3.25) relies on a weak argument, as the politicians are indifferent on whether to 
repay debt or not. The argument implies that the debt level in the election period will be 
zero, and will allow a simpler notation. However, the arguments could easily be augmented 
to the case where to debt at the start of the election period was not zero, not affecting the 
qualitative conclusions. Given (3.25), the budget constraint in the election period is 
therefore:  
    
       
 
    
       
The expected outcome of electing the opponent (which has an expected competence level of 
zero) is: 
        
   
      
    
       
The expected value next period of reelecting the incumbent is 
        
   
             
 
      
 
           
 
      
       
Note that the expected value of the competence shock in t+1 is zero.  
The utility function of the consumers is now augmented to the following: 
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Shi and Svennson (2006) assume there is a constant fraction of the population that is 
“uninformed” – i.e. unable to observe the contemporaneous debt level. As the uninformed 
part of the population cannot observe the contemporaneous public debt level or the amount 
of government purchases    directly, they form some estimate of it. As already discussed, all 
voters can observe the competence of the incumbent indirectly, but that requires calculating 
and hence disutility. So, the utility function of the consumers is augmented by adding two 
parts, shown in (3.29).    is a binary variable being a positive constant if the consumer 
calculates the contemporaneous debt level of the politicians, and zero otherwise. It is 
multiplied by the absolute value of the parameter   
    hence consumers have varying levels 
of disutility of computing the debt level. The parameters   
        
  are equal to     except 
that they each have their own distribution amongst the population (I.e. a single consumer 
may have different values of the three heterogeneity parameters). The function         
     captures that consumers will dislike to be fooled. If a consumer has kept on to his belief 
of the current debt level through the election year, and he finds the next year that the 
government debt level was larger than what he expected, he will be disgruntled. The function 
             thus captures the disutility associated with this disgruntledness, and is further 
multiplied by the absolute value of the heterogeneity factor   
  to capture that getting duped 
will cause a varying degree of disutility. The disutility takes place next period, hence the 
             is discounted by  . 
So, each consumer will have to choose between incurring some disutility now or later; i.e. 
investigate the debt level now or expect to get deceived and find out how badly later. From 
this it is intuitive to see that consumers will choose to investigate the actual debt level at 
differing levels of expected divergence between actual debt level and the belief. The 
population as a whole can thus be divided in two; one uninformed and one informed part.  
The uninformed part of the population,    , will be decreasing with increased divergence 
between the expected and actual debt level, i.e. that  
                  
  
         
                    
Furthermore,       . I.e for debt levels equal to the expected level the entire electorate is 
uninformed. The proportion of inobservant voters in the case of        is not important as 
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this would mean deliberately disappointing the voters. However, it would be natural to 
assume that      is convex.  
Using the IS (3.13) and PC- curves (3.14), and substituting in for    using the government 
budget constraint (3.23), it can be solved for the current debt level:  
               
 
 
 
         
 
                                 
                        
    
 
        
 
      
            
Observant voters use (3.32) to calculate the contemporaneous debt level. Note that        
per assumption.  
Assume the estimated debt level is   . From here on,    is treated as observable for the 
incumbent politician. This approach is equal to that in Shi and Svennson (2006), and could 
be supported by the argument that the incumbent politician has the ministry of finance at its 
disposal, which could easily calculate the general public’s expectations. As the uninformed 
voters know the politicians equilibrium strategy, they can use this to form an estimate of the 
incumbent’s competence level 
   
           
        
Voter i will vote for the incumbent if  
    
             
Recall that there are two politicians, where the opponent has an expected competence of 
zero. Thus, the probability of the incumbent receiving 50% of the votes is given by 
           
  
 
 
                         
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                           
  
                                     
Again, F is a zero mean density function with F’(0)>0. At the beginning of time t, the 
incumbent politician will choose B as to maximize his expected utility over the following 
two years. Period t is an election period, and period t+1 is not. The politician will receive 
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rents the in year t, as he is already in office, but will only receive rents in year t+1 if he is re-
elected.  
 The politician’s optimization problem must take the central banks response into account. As 
shown earlier, with floating exchange rates the central bank will set the interest rate to 
achieve the trade-off in       . It turns out that it is hardly necessary to set up the 
politician’s maximization problem in the case of floating exchange rates. The central bank 
will react to increased government spending by adjusting the interest rate according to (3.18) 
Given the assumption on the visibility of the the interest rate, consumers will use the central 
banks response to learn the current government debt level, and hence the competence of the 
incumbent. This implies that it is futile to manipulate the electorate, thus there will be no 
budget cycles in the case of floating exchange rates. This leads to proposition 1: 
Proposition 1: Budget cycles will never be an equilibrium strategy if the exchange rate 
is allowed to float freely. 
Again, the fundamental assumption that supports proposition 1 is that in the case of floating 
exchange rates, it is costless to calculate the contemporaneous debt level using the interest 
rate. It should be noted that expectations of the next period are treated as given. At least for 
the observant part of the electorate, lowered government spending will decrease the expected 
government spending next period. Moreover, other variables may be subject to change as 
well, such as increased expected production and inflation. All such changes will have an 
effect on the interest rate the central bank decides on. Finally, the model abstracts from 
shocks that may affect the economy. Describing the central banks reaction function taking 
these points into account is beyond the scope of this setup. However, the general point 
remains that the central bank will in fact react to increased government spending by 
adjusting the interest rate. The validity of the assumption on the treatment of the interest rate 
is discussed further in section 5.  
The result from proposition 1 is quite strong, and is in agreement with Clark and Hallerberg 
(2000) in the case of an independent central bank and floating exchange rates. However, the 
underlying mechanism behind the findings is vastly different. In Clark and Hallerberg 
(2000), the model predicts that increased government spending will merely crowd out 
exports leaving total production unaffected. In the model in this paper however, increased 
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government spending would indeed affect production, but it would not benefit the re-election 
probabilities of the incumbent.  
The result from proposition 1 could also be reviewed in a New-Keynesian context. Clarida et 
al (1999) describes optimal monetary policy in a closed economy setting, where they show 
how the central bank should respond to demand and supply shocks. The general point, which 
is valid also in the open economy case, is simply that the central bank indeed will respond to 
shocks that affect the economy – government spending shocks as well. Thus, the question is: 
how can budget cycles be an equilibrium strategy when the central bank will try to fend off 
the effects of the government spending shock? Proposition 1 answer clearly: It is not the 
equilibrium strategy at all.  
3.3.3 Case III: Elections and fixed exchange rates 
If the exchange rate is pegged, the model implies that: 
   
   
 
   
   
         
Due to uncovered interest parity, monetary policy is kept occupied maintaining the exchange 
rate peg. It will therefore not react at all to government spending.  
The politician’s optimization problem can now be formulated (omitting periods t+3 and 
onwards, as they do not contain the relevant decision variables): 
                          
                                          
The first order condition is: 
  
   
  
  
   
                       
Increased spending thus has to effects: Firstly, it manipulates the uninformed part of the 
electorate, thereby increasing the probability of getting re-elected. Secondly, increased 
spending reduces the uninformed part of the population, thus reducing the probability of 
getting re-elected.  
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Increased government spending will have some real economic effects on both production 
and inflation. Furthermore, even though taxes are assumed to be fixed, the consumers’ 
budget constraint will be affected by increased government spending. The effect will come 
through the increased price level, increased production and thus increased wages and profits. 
However, as per the assumption of “costly inference” based on the price and production 
aggregates, the uninformed part of the population will not know the actual debt level.  
The first order condition (3.38), together with the assumption in (3.31) implies that the 
equilibrium debt level is     . I.e, with the given assumptions it cannot be ruled out that 
     will be the equilibrium solution. However, this is treated as more of a fine point, and 
the discussion will in the following ignore this possibility even though it would be 
interesting to explore which requirements on      that would rule out     . 
The discussion can be summarized in proposition 2: 
 Proposition 2: With a fixed exchange rate regime, there will be an equilibrium deficit 
in election years. 
As proposition 2 displays a stark contrast to proposition 1, an explanation is in place. 
Imagine a small country that that has pegged its exchange rate that of to a large country. Due 
to its size, the economic policies of the small country have no effect on the large country. 
Thus, the central bank of the large country will not respond at all to the policies undertaken 
by the small country.   
As this small country has no independent monetary policy, the setup now reverts to 
something that looks like a standard game of budget cycles. As long as there is an 
unobservant part of the electorate that it is possible to manipulate, budget cycles will be the 
equilibrium policy.  
It is vital to point out that in this example it is irrelevant if the large country has a floating 
exchange rate. The important part is that the small country has fixed its exchange rate to that 
of the large country, and that the large country’s interest rate does not respond to the actions 
by the small country. 
 A fine point is that it is crucial for the model outcome that the central bank does not at all 
respond to varying levels of competence for the incumbent politician. In other words; the 
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inflationary pressure of government spending is equal irrespective of the competence level of 
the incumbent politician.  
3.3.4 Case IV: Intermediary exchange rate regimes 
It is possible that a country has a gap between the upper and lower nominal exchange rate 
limit i.e. the currency is allowed to float somewhat. Assuming the exchange rate initially is 
somewhere between the limits, the central bank will respond to increased government 
spending by increasing the interest rate according to   
   
   
 
 
     
          
          
         
This is exactly the same response as in the floating exchange rate case. Similarly, the voters 
will, by observing the interest rate, understand how much government consumption 
increases so the reelection probability will be unchanged.  
However, increasing the interest rate will cause an appreciation. Using UIP and inserting for 
the lower limit of the exchange rate yields the following:  
  
           
   
                  
When the interest rate reaches   
           
, it cannot be increased any further as that would 
require a appreciation above the limit (note that a decrease of e is an appreciation). So, if the 
government were to increase expenditures further, the central bank would not respond.  
With an intermediary exchange rate regime, the government would then first have to pick up 
the slack, by increasing government spending to the point where the exchange rate reaches 
its limit and thus removing the ability of the central bank of increasing the interest rate 
further. Up to that point, the reelection probability will remain unchanged. However, from 
here on the game is equal to that of the fixed exchange rate regime case, in that only a share 
of the voters will be able to observe the actual government expenditures. So, the politicians 
will then continue to increase spending according to (36) 
It then follows that the budget cycle will be larger in the intermediary exchange rate regime 
case compared to that of the fixed exchange rate regime case. From this discussion 
proposition 3 can be formulated: 
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 Proposition 3: If the exchange rate limits are close enough, there will be an 
equilibrium budget cycle in election years. The cycle will also be larger compared to 
that in the fixed exchange rate regime case. 
A weakness of the model is that there are no limits to how much government expenditures 
are allowed to increase in election years. A question that should be answered is how close is 
“close enough”? Unfortunately, this model does not provide a good answer. As long as there 
exists a limit to the exchange rate, it is possible to reach it. Thus, “close enough” is any 
finite number. Augmenting the model by adding e.g. fiscal conservative voters and 
politicians that derive utility from consumption of public goods are examples of factors that 
would help the model provide a more realistic prediction.  
3.3.5 Information and corruption 
Shi and Svennson (2006) found that the magnitude of the cycles would depend on i: the rents 
that the politicians received from being in office, and ii: the proportion of the inobservant 
part of the electorate.  
Similar results can be reproduced with the setup in this paper. The derivative of (3.30) 
determines how deviation from the expected debt level will increase the informed part of the 
population.  
  
         
                    
As the inobservant part of the electorate is an endogenous variable in this model, it is the size 
of (3.41) that is important in determining the magnitude of the cycles. If there is very limited 
access to free media in a country, (3.41) will be close to zero. Hence, few voters will be able 
to learn to what extent manipulation is going on, thus will the cycles be relatively large. 
Alternatively, with very good access to free media (3.41) could be very large. Here, almost 
any attempt to manipulate voters will be understood by the electorate and hence the budget 
cycles will be very small. From these arguments proposition 4 can be formulated:  
Propostition 4: Conditional on the exchange rate regime allowing for budget cycles, 
increased access to information will decrease the magnitude of the budget cycles. 
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Finally, there is the topic of corruption. Shi and Svennson (2006) stated that increased rents 
from staying in office will increase the magnitude of the budget cycles. The link to 
corruption is not as clear cut in this thesis. However, the budget cycles in themselves should 
be accepted as a type of corruption. Political corruption, as defined by Transparency 
International, is “the abuse of entrusted power by political leaders for private gain, with the 
objective of increasing power or wealth” (Transparency 2004:11). Now, turn to the first 
order condition in (36).   
  
   
  
  
   
                               
 (3.42) states that the gain from manipulation comes from exceeding the expectations of the 
voters. With a high general level of corruption in a country, voters will expect a higher 
deficit compared to a country with a lower level of corruption. Thus, the incumbent in the 
highly corrupt country will generate a high deficit. With a lower general level of corruption, 
and hence a lower expected deficit level, the incumbent politician need not run a very large 
deficit to exceed the inobservant part of the electorates expectations. From this discussion, 
proposition 5 can be formulated:  
Proposition 5: Conditional on the exchange rate regime allowing for budget cycles, will 
a higher expected deficit in election years leads to an even higher realized deficit in 
election years.  
Even though it might be thought of as a “chicken or egg” discussion, based on proposition 5 
the budget cycles should be expected to be larger in countries with a higher general level of 
corruption. 
It should be pointed out that that proposition 5 does not depend on the rents associated with 
remaining in office as opposed to the findings in Shi and Svennson (2006). However, if the 
politicians’ utility function had been augmented to include consumption, the rents associated 
with remaining in office would play a part in determining the magnitude of the budget 
cycles.   
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3.4 Simulation 
In order to simulate the model, the function that determines the inobservant part of the 
electorate must be specified. A simple function that satisfies the requirements is of the 
following form:  
                
 
 
                      
Using the first order condition in the case of fixed exchange rate regimes, it can easily be 
verified that the solution to the politician’s maximisation problem in an election year is given 
by: 
                
I.e. the politicians will always spend   more than the estimate by voters in election years.  
The IS- and PC-curves may need some adjustment, to take into account that the inobservant 
and observant part of the electorate has different expectations of next period. The difference 
between the two types of voters is that the uninformed voters underestimate spending in this 
period. Sticking to the assumption that the government will repay its debt in the year 
between elections, this means that the uninformed voters will overestimate government 
consumption and hence production next period. Also, the expected inflation will be too high. 
Furthermore, the PC-curve should be adjusted, as this has been derived in part from the 
consumers’ optimisation problem. 
Taking the aforementioned points fully into account will essentially require remodelling the 
entire setup. The benefit of such an adjustment will depend on the parameter    If   is small, 
there will hardly be any difference between the expectations of the two types of consumers. 
Note that assuming   is small does not imply that the budget cycles themselves are small as 
that also depends on the expected debt level. The solution adopted here is thus to keep the IS 
and PC curves as they are, and leave   to be a small, positive number 
In the model setup it is assumed that taxes and debts are nominal. Thus, the variable g=-ln(1-
G/Y) actually contains the prevailing price level, as the government budget constraint can be 
rewritten to: 
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This complicates the simulation of the model, and makes it difficult to isolate the analytical 
expressions for production and inflation. A simple solution is to assume that taxes and debt 
are scaled according to the current price level; hence      drops out of the budget restriction 
altogether. For the debt level, this solution implies that the debt is issued through inflation 
indexed bonds.  
Parameter values are taken from Gali and Monacelli (2005), shown in table 3.1. 
                
3 1.2 1.2 6 0.75 0.99 0.4 
Table 3.1 
Some additional parameter values are chosen, shown in table 3.2. The implication of the 
numerical value of the estimated debt level is that the magnitude of the cycles is similar to 
the shocks that are used in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005) (the typical “1%” shock). 
          
0.01 0.00001 0.25 0 
Table 3.2 
The “fixed exchange rate”-version of the model is simulated, thus keeping the interest rate 
fixed.  
Values of expected inflation, production and government consumption the period after the 
last simulated period are chosen through linear programming, by minimising the sum of 
squared changes of inflation and production over all periods. These values turn out to be 
domestic inflation of about          and production      (I.e. Y=1). Note that the results 
are fairly sensitive to the endpoint parameter values that are chosen. 11 periods are simulated 
from t=0 to t=10.  
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A peculiarity of this model, given the values of    relative to  , is that the budget cycles are 
not shocks; they are on the contrary expected events. Thus, the simulation should not be 
limited to the election year and onwards, but should also include the run-up to the election. 
The election is therefore held in period 5, so the effects on the economy in the years before 
the election can be shown as well.  
The assumption that all government debt is repaid the year after the election is arbitrary, and 
probably unrealistic. Thus, two cases are simulated; one where all debt is repaid the year 
after the election, and one where a share of 0.3 of the debt is repaid every year after the 
election. The ratio of 0.3 is probably also in the high end, and is no less arbitrary.  
 
Figure 3.1 Government consumption subtracted steady state value, for repayment ratios of 1 
and 0.3. The Y-axis is over “gapped” government consumption, and the X-axis is over time. 
The election is held at t=5.  
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of government consumption in the two cases. Both curves are 
identical up to and including t=5. Thereafter G drops to about -0.0104 below its steady state 
value in the case where all debt is repaid and to about -0.03 in the second case. G remains at 
its steady state value thereafter in the case where the debt is repaid, in climbs asymptotically 
to its steady state value in the case where the repayment ratio is 0.3.  
Figure 3.2 show the output gap for the two repayment ratios. Aside from the peak, it is most 
interesting to note that output drops below its steady state value in the year before the 
election. Also, in the full repayment case, output does not simply revert to its steady state 
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value after the election but climbs to a higher value in t=7, for thereafter to decline steadily 
towards its steady state value.  
 
Figure 3.2 Output less steady state value, for the two repayment ratios. The Y-axis is over 
the output gap, and the X-axis is over time. The election is held at t=5.  
Figure 3.3 shows the evolution of domestic price inflation, less its steady state value (note 
that consumer price inflation is equal to domestic price inflation in this case, multiplied by 
     , due to fixed exchange rate and zero foreign price inflation). Here it is also evident 
that the effects of the budget cycle are seen both before and after the election. Inflation 
increases, and lies above its steady state value in the years before the election. An 
explanation for this is that firms wishes to ensure that they have set prices high enough to 
benefit from the demand surge in the election year. Naturally, inflation drops significantly in 
t=6. From t=7 and onwards however, inflation is higher than its steady state value in the full 
repayment case, consistent with a corresponding positive output gap.  
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Figure 3.3 Domestic price inflation (DPI) less steady state value, for the two repayment 
ratios. The Y-axis is over gapped domestic price inflation (dpi), and the X-axis is over time. 
The election is held at t=5.  
Shortly, the thesis proceeds to the empirical section. When performing the empirical 
analysis, the variable that is used to search for budget cycles is G/Y, government 
consumption as a share of production. Figure 3.4 plots the simulated evolution of this 
variable.  
 
Figure 3.4 Government consumption as a share of output for the two repayment ratios. The 
Y-axis is over G/Y, and the X-axis is over time. The election is held at t=5.  
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3.5 Model Conclusion 
Section 3 has developed a model over political budget cycles in a small, open economy. 
Including the central bank has some quite non-trivial consequences.  First, budget cycles will 
never be an equilibrium policy if the exchange rate is allowed to float freely. The mechanism 
that ensures this is that the interest rate, which is a highly visible economic variable for 
consumers, conveys information on the public fiscal policies. Manipulation is therefore not 
possible in this case.  
The opposite conclusion prevails when the exchange rate is pegged. In this case the central 
bank will not respond to fiscal policies, and will therefore not provide voters with any new 
information. Manipulation will thus be an equilibrium policy. Budget cycles will also prevail 
with intermediary exchange rate regimes, and the cycles are predicted to be larger to that of 
the fixed exchange rate regime case.   
Also, it is shown that both an increased share of inobservant voters and an increased 
expected deficit in election years will cause the actual deficit to increase.  
Simulation of the small open economy in the case of a fixed exchange rate has given some 
insight in the evolution of production and inflation in the presence of political budget cycles. 
In particular, it is shown that these variables are affected by the budget cycles both before 
and after the election, as well as the actual election year. Further, the simulation has shown 
that the political budget cycle is not a shock, but an anticipated feature of the elections. This 
conclusion rests on some of the assumed parameter values.  
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4. Empirical testing 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The data set is an unbalanced panel over 141 countries, covering the years 1990 to 2009. 
Countries have only been omitted where there were either no data available, or that the 
country was not relevant in that no elections were held. 1990 was chosen as the first year due 
to the assumption of that the central bank is independent; thus hopefully avoiding to include 
years where this assumption is not met. Table 4.1 displays summary statistics of the 
variables in the data set.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      Country 2707 70.94 40.63 1 141 
Year 2707 1 999.33 5.65 1990 2009 
G/Y 2707 15.58 6.37 1.40 69.54 
y 2707 23.51 2.26 18.96 30.09 
Corruption 1702 -0.48 0.24 -0.99 -0.04 
CBI 1183 0.28 0.27 -0.60 0.78 
Election 2662 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Info 1401 0.26 0.32 0 1.82 
FX-regime 2234 2.24 0.83 1 3 
El. Schedule 1933 2.70 0.53 1 3 
AFM 377 637.84 860.12 0.21 4383.92 
Table 4.1 
The data set consists of 2 707 observations. However, many variables contain missing values 
as e.g. the variable AFM with only 377 observations. I was unfortunately not able to find 
more data to reduce the amount of missing observations.  
The variable of interest is G/Y; government consumption as a percentage of GDP. The 
variable is multiplied by 100, and table 4.1 shows great heterogeneity in the sample with 
range from 1.4 to 69.54. This variable was obtained through the World Development 
Indicators dataset (WDI). Also collected from the WDI-dataset was production, y; log of 
GDP in 2000 USD. This variable will be transformed later on to obtain a measure of the 
output gap.  
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The variable Corruption measures the overall level of corruption in a country. The source of 
this variable is Transparency International, where data is collected from their 2001 survey. 
Following Shi & Svennson (2006), only observations from 2001 are used, assuming that the 
level of corruption is fairly persistent over time.  The data from the Transparency 
International survey has been scaled by diving by 10, and is multiplied by -1. Thus, the 
values of Corruption lie between -1 to 0, and a higher value of Corruption indicates higher 
overall level of corruption.   
In order to test the propositions from section 3, some measure of the exchange rate regime 
must be obtained. The variable FX-regime measures the de facto exchange rate regime in a 
country in a given year. The variable can take three values, 1, 2 and 3, which corresponds to 
a floating, intermediary or fixed exchange rate regime. There are two sources for this 
variable, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005b) and the International Monetary Fund. 
Appendix 7 provides some additional details regarding this variable.  
Measuring central bank independence is in general difficult, as what this thesis focuses on is 
de facto central bank independence. There have been various attempts at measuring this 
through proxies, e.g. by classifying the laws that govern the autonomy of the central bank, or 
to measure the turnover rate of central bank governors. A combination of these measures 
were used in generating the variable CBI, where a higher level of CBI indicates a higher 
level of central bank independence. Several sources were used in generating this variable, 
and appendix 7 gives some additional details.  
The variable Election it takes the value 1 if there was an election in that country in the given 
year, and is zero otherwise. The source is the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). From 
this source the variable SYSTEM is used, which identifies whether a country has 
parliamentary, assembly-elected president or presidential system. Also, two binary election 
variables were collected, LEGELEC and EXELEC, which had the value one if there was a 
legislative or executive election, respectively. Thus, the Election variable has the value one if 
one of the two conditions are met:  
 The country has a presidential system and there is an executive election that 
given year, 
 The country has either a parliamentary or an assembly elected president, and 
there is a legislative election that given year.  
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If neither of these conditions were met, the election variable has the value zero. In total, 582 
elections are observed. This approach contrasts e.g. Hagen (2010), who used parliamentary 
elections only. The approach taken in this thesis is similar to the approach in Shi and 
Svennson (2006).   
In order to control for the impact of the availability of information on PBC, the methodology 
from Shi and Svennson (2006) is followed. The variable Info is generated, which is a 
measure of the joint effect of availability of information and free media. A higher value of 
Info indicates more information available to the public. The sources of the Info variable were 
Freedom House and the International Telecommunication Union. Appendix 7 provides some 
details in how this variable was calculated.  
A recurring subject in the empirical literature on budget cycles is the possible endogeneity in 
timing of elections. To control for this, the variable El. Schedule is collected from the 
Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP). This variable can take the following values: 
1.  if there is no formal election schedule,  
2.  if there are exact, fixed intervals between elections, and  
3. if there are formal rules governing the intervals between elections, but the 
timing is to some degree left to the discretion of the political system.  
Unfortunately, the IAEP dataset only include observations up until 2005, and does not 
contain information on all the countries in the data set.  
The model as laid out in section 3 assumes that consumers can participate in capital markets. 
With 141 countries in the data set, this may be a too strong assumption. Thus, the variable 
AFM, an acronym for Access to Financial Markets, is included as well. AFM measures 
access to various financial institutions and financial instruments per 1000 inhabitants. The 
source of the variable is International Monetary Fund – Financial Access Survey, and some 
additional details can be found in appendix 7.  
4.2 Properties of the data and transformations 
4.2.1 General model 
The general model of interest has the following form:  
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The error term will in general consist of several parts, as shown in 4.2.  
                   
 
 
 
     
 
   
      
   is a country specific effect which is invariant over time, and      is an error term.    are 
shocks that affect all countries equally each year.      
 
 
 
     
 
   capture that there might be 
autocorrelation of order p.  
Entorf (1997) shows that the general spurious regression result holds for panel data, using a 
fixed effects estimator, when N is finite and T approaches infinity. The problem arises due to 
non-stationarity of the error term. Including the lagged dependent variable in the 
specification, as shown in (4.1), might not be sufficient to avoid this problem as there is no 
reason to ex ante believe that the parameter    is equal across all countries. Thus, there may 
not be a single parameter value for    that renders all series stationary. Furthermore, one of 
the estimators that could potentially be used, the System-GMM estimator, requires that 
     (Roodman 2009). The only variable in (4.1) that could have a unit root is G/Y – 
hence it is important to ensure that this series is stationary. 
Performing unit root tests on panel data is not straightforward. Most of the available tests are 
only available for strictly balanced panels, and the alternative hypotheses are in other cases 
not relevant for the purposes in this thesis (e.g. that one of the individual countries time 
series is stationary). Appendix 8 explains in detail the stationarity properties of G/Y using 
various tests. In general the null of a unit root of G/Y cannot be rejected. 
There are several possible ways of solving the problem of non stationarity. Seeing how the 
research question deals with the short term movements in G/Y, the solution adopted in this 
thesis is to primarily rely on HP-filtering G/Y. This ensures that G/Y is stationary. Appendix 
9 explains the HP-filter in detail, and also discusses the justification for using the filter 
approach. Applying the HP-filter alters the serial correlation properties of the series, and 
could also change the correlation between the filtered series and other variables. It is 
therefore important to take serial correlation into account in the analysis, and also ensure that 
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any results are not driven by the HP-filter itself. To test for this, regressions on the first 
differenced G/Y is used as a robustness test. Appendix 8 discusses the stationarity properties 
of FD G/Y.  
The control variable   , the output gap  is calculated by applying the HP-filter to a time 
series of log of GDP in constant 2000 USD. The standard value of          is used when 
the filter is applied.  
Table 4.2 displays the properties of the two HP-filtered series of G/Y and y.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      hp G/Y 2707            1.3474 -15.743 14.4912 
   2707             0.02829 -0.4075 0.19751 
Table 4.2 
4.2.2 Endogeneity 
It is probably not reasonable to assume that the election dummies are strictly exogenous, as 
incumbent politicians can influence the election date in most countries. Brender and Drazen 
(2005) note that the sign of the correlation between the error in the previous period and the 
election dummies is not clear. One possibility is that the election dummies are correlated 
with the error in the previous period. For instance, elections are more likely to be held if the 
previous error is low This implies that GPD is high – i.e. strategic set election date as 
examined in Alesina et al (1993). They did not find evidence of this type of strategic use of 
election dates in their sample of 18 OECD-economies, with the exception of Japan.  
Another possibility is that an election is more likely if the previous error is high – i.e. that 
the election is held as a response to a recession (Brender and Drazen (2005)). It is even 
possible that the election dummies should even be treated as endogenous, if the lag between 
e.g. a negative macro shock to an election is held is small. Brender and Drazen explored the 
possibility of endogeneity of the election dates, and found that the qualitative results are the 
same regardless of how the dates are treated (2005). Shi and Svennson (2006) found 
significant budget cycles for both predetermined and endogenous elections, except for 
developed countries.  
 55 
  , the output gap, is probably not strictly exogenous either, as it is possibly correlated with 
the previous and/or contemporaneous error. In Hagen (2010), where the left hand side 
variable is the primary surplus in percent of GDP, the estimated size of the budget cycle is 
slightly higher when taking the lack of strict exogeneity of the election dummy and the 
GDP-gap into account. 
The dataset at hand divides the election schedule in three possible categories. Brender and 
Drazen discuss the subject of election schedules, and warns first of that the de jure election 
schedule might not be corresponding to the de facto election schedule. Second, the 
distinction between a “flexible” and “fixed” election schedule is a simplification, as they 
note: “…almost all countries have some provision for elections at a date earlier than the end 
of the legally mandated term of office for the executive or the legislature, whether the 
elections actually occur at the legally determined date is an empirical question” 
(2005:1282).  
The consensus from the aforementioned papers is then that ignoring the potential lack of 
strict exogeneity in the election dummies and the output gap will not affect the results 
significantly. Section 4.3 provides a brief discussion on the subject, where the  sample is 
split according to election schedule. From this, it can be seen if there appears to be 
fundamental differences between the two types of election schedule regimes.   
4.2.3 Estimators 
Dynamic panel estimation calls for some carefulness when choosing which estimator to use. 
However, the effects of the HP-filtering process should be taken into account. Note that from 
table 4.2, the mean of hp G/Y is very close to zero. In fact, all the country specific series 
have a similar near-zero mean (the largest country mean in absolute value is         ). As 
a consequence, the country-specific fixed effect in (4.2) can be ignored. Thus, (4.1) can be 
rewritten to the following: 
    
 
 
 
   
       
 
 
 
     
                  
 
   
             
 
 
 
     
 
   
       
As (4.3) does not contain a country specific fixed effect, it can be estimated by OLS. 
However, it is important to be aware of the serial correlation properties of hp G/Y. In the 
presence of serial correlation, OLS is still consistent although it may not be the most 
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efficient estimator. However, the estimated standard errors will be biased, and should be 
corrected. Section 4.2.4 elaborates on this. It should also be pointed out that using a Random 
Effects estimator will not be more efficient than OLS, as there is virtually no between 
country variation.  
As it should be tested that any results are not driven by the HP-filter itself, there is a need for 
a second estimation strategy. Taking into account the stationarity properties of the series 
G/Y, a natural starting point is the differenced version of (4.1). Running OLS on a first-
differenced version of (4.1) will lead to an inconsistent estimator, due to correlation between 
the lagged, differenced dependent variable and the differenced error. The bias does not 
decrease with an increased T (Verbeek 2008).  
There have been proposed several estimators based on FD-OLS that aim to remove the bias 
related to the lagged dependent variable. In general, the solution offered by these estimators 
is to instrument the lagged dependent variable with deeper lags of the dependent variable. 
The simplest of these estimators is the one proposed by Anderson-Hsiao (1982) (AH), where 
the dependent variable lagged two periods is used to instrument the lagged dependent 
variable
3
. A more refined GMM-estimator is proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) (AB), 
where further lags of the dependent variable are used to instrument the lagged dependent 
variable. Necessary conditions for the consistency of these estimators are that the 
instruments are valid, hence no autocorrelation in the error term, and that the data set is large 
enough.  
However, it is questionable if any of these estimators are superior to FD-OLS, given the 
properties of G/Y. The AH-estimator is shown to potentially have large biases when the 
underlying series is close to having a unit root (Arellano and Bover (1995)). As shown in 
appendix 9, this is likely to be the case here. The AB-estimator does not appear to be an 
attractive option either, as Verbeek notes that “..if the true coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is close to unity, lagged levels as employed in the Arellano-Bond 
procedure are poor instruments for first differences” (2008:388).  
                                                 
3 An alternative is to use the differenced dependent variable lagged two periods as instrument for the lagged dependent 
variable. Arellano (1989) shows that using the differenced instrument causes the model to suffer from large variance.  
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As a final note, the system-GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998) is not appropriate, as it exploits stationarity assumptions could 
well be violated in this case (as    appears to be close to unity).  
However, the consequences of the bias of FD-OLS need not be too bad as there is a low 
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and other explanatory variables. Thus, the 
bias may not contaminate the coefficient estimates of the interesting variables very much. 
So, this is the estimator that is used as a robustness test in section 4.3.5.  
If it is assumed that G/Y itself is stationary there are many estimators to choose from, such 
as SYS-GMM, FE-estimator or corrected least square dummy variable (Bruno 2005a, 
2005b). These estimators have been tried, and do in general yield results that are 
qualitatively equal to that of FD-OLS and the results obtained using HP-filtered series. Thus, 
the results from these estimators are not included in this thesis.  
 
4.2.4 Robust standard errors 
From the discussion so far, it is clear that there are the challenges of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation that should be countered.  
The usual assumption of that                  , where X is a vector of all explanatory 
variables and     is the error term, still holds even in the presence of both heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation. However, it is also common to assume that                      
  
   where I is the identity matrix, i.e. that the variance of the error term is constant 
conditional on all explanatory variables. This assumption is not appropriate for this case, and 
the consequence is that the “standard” standard errors are misleading.  
One possible strategy to overcome this problem is to re-specify the model. However, the HP-
filtering process has made this approach difficult. Due to possible autocorrelation up to a 
high order, including the appropriate lags in the specification will cause the loss of many 
observations. Further, the heteroscedasticity imposed by the end-point bias of the HP-filter 
would still require a solution.  
It is more convenient to use standard errors that rely on more realistic assumptions. By 
assuming that              for all    , i.e. that the errors of different countries are 
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uncorrelated, standard errors that are robust to both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
can be computed. The approach is an extension of the heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors proposed by Huber (1967) and Newey and West (1987). These standard errors are 
called cluster robust standard errors, as they allow for correlation between error terms within 
a cluster. In this setting a cluster is a country, so to be able to calculate the cluster robust 
standard errors it is only required to assume that there is no correlation in errors between 
countries. As year-dummies are included in the analysis, this is not a restrictive requirement.  
Unfortunately, the cluster robust errors rely on asymptotics, meaning that N or T should be 
sufficiently large. This might not be the case here, so it will be prudent to show some 
carefulness when interpreting the results.  
 
4.2.5 Subsamples 
The model in section 3 relies on two vital assumptions. The first is that the central bank is 
independent. The second assumption relates to the treatment of the interest rate in the model, 
and as a minimum, this assumption implies that the consumers should have access to 
financial markets. The implication for the empirical analysis is that there is a trade-off 
between sample size on the one hand, and a sample consistent with the model assumptions 
on the other hand.  
The solution that is adopted in this thesis is that regressions are run in three different 
samples. The first sample consists of the entire data set of 141 countries. The second sample, 
denoted subsample 1, controls for that the central bank is independent, using the variable 
CBI. Preferably, there should be a dummy variable in the data set, taking the value 1 if the 
central bank is independent, and zero in all other cases. What is available is the variable CBI, 
varying from -0.59 to 0.78, where a higher value indicates a more independent central bank. 
So, in need for setting a limit for when the central bank is independent, the regression is run 
conditional on CBI>0
4
.  68 countries have observations that meet the condition of CBI>0. 
                                                 
4
 Many different values of CBI have been tested, and it turns out that the results are not at all 
sensitive to the value of CBI that is chosen. This is unsurprising, given the open definition of central 
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The third sample, denoted subsample 2, controls for both central bank independence and the 
assumption of access to financial markets. The assumption of participation in capital markets 
share the same difficulties as with central bank independence, as some number of AFM must 
be chosen as the cut off value. Specifically, the value of AFM was set fairly low, 500. 
However, seeing that only 19 countries meet both conditions, the sample is extended 
somewhat. As there are many OECD-economies where there are missing observations for 
one or both of CBI and AFM, all OECD-economies are also included. This is based on the 
assumption that with the given time period, from 1990 and onwards, both CBI-independence 
and access in financial markets were in place. This third sample is covers 38 countries, with 
an average T of 15.  
Table 4.3 sums up the three samples that will be used.  
Sample name Selection Criterion Countries Av. T 
All None 141 19.2 
Subsample 1 CBI>0 68 15.4 
Subsample 2 Both CBI>0 and AFM>500, or OECD 38 15 
  Table 4.3 
4.3 Results 
Equation (4.3) is amended to the following:  
    
 
 
 
   
          
 
 
 
     
                                     
                        
 
   
           
Here   , which is is the intercept, has been inserted, even though it would be consistent to 
leave    out. However, as T-1 year dummies are included in the specification as well (not 
shown), the intercept can be interpreted as the time effect the year without the year dummy. 
The elections are split in three, according to the exchange rate regimes. The variables 
Election|Fix, Election|Else and Election|Float have properties equal to Election, except that 
                                                                                                                                                      
bank independence used in the model (i.e. that only instrument independence is needed for the model 
assumption of independence to be ok).  
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they will equal one only if the country that given year is classified as having a fixed, 
intermediate or floating exchange rate regime, respectively.  
The propositions from section 3 can now be translated to testable hypotheses. These are:  
Proposition 1: The coefficient on elections held in countries with floating exchange 
rate,   ,  should be zero.  
Proposition 2: The coefficient on elections held in countries with a fixed exchange 
rate,    should be positive 
Proposition 3: The coefficient on elections held in countries with an intermediary 
exchange rate regime,    should be positive, and larger than the coefficient on 
countries with a fixed exchange rate. 
For proposition 4 it is necessary to add further regressors to (4.4). Using the methodology 
from Shi and Svennson (2006), and taking into account that the effect of information and 
corruption is conditional on that the exchange rate regime allows for budget cycles, 
interactions between the three election variables in (4.3) and the information variable Info 
are added (not shown).  
Proposition 4: The coefficient on the interaction variables Election|Fix * Info and 
Election|Else * Info  should be negative. The coefficient on the interaction 
Election|Float * Info should be zero.  
When testing proposition 5 a similar methodology is used, except that Info is replaced by 
Corruption.  
Proposition 5: The coefficient on the interaction variables Election|Fix * Corruption 
and Election|Else * Corruption should be positive. The coefficient on the interaction 
variable Election|Float * Corruption should be zero.  
When testing propositions 4 and 5 the coefficients on the election variables should have 
signs in accordance with propositions 1 through 3.  
The strategy for testing these hypotheses is as follows:  First, section 4.3.1 tests propositions 
1, 2 and 3. Thereafter, section 4.3.2 will test proposition 4, and section 4.3.3 tests proposition 
5. Section 4.3.4 will briefly discuss the endogeneity of the election variable. Section 4.3.5 
will thereafter extend the analysis to include the years adjacent to the election year.  
The results presented in section 4.3.1 to 4.3.4 all relies on the HP-filter. As a robustness test, 
all specifications have been run using FD-OLS. As the results from FD-OLS are 
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quantitatively very similar to the results found with the HP-filtered series, the robustness test 
results are relegated to appendix 10.  
4.3.1 Proposition 1, 2 and 3 – Exchange rate regimes 
Proposals 1 and 2 from section 3 can now be tested
5
: firstly that budget cycles are never to 
be present in countries with a floating exchange rate regime, and secondly that political 
budget cycles will only be present in countries where the exchange rate constraints are 
binding.  
If proposal 1 is true, the coefficient on Election|Float should be zero. This can clearly not be 
rejected. In all three samples, the estimated coefficient on Election|Float is insignificant and 
close to zero.  
Dep. Var:  
 
hp G/Y   hp G/Y 
 
hp G/Y 
 Regression 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 Estimator  OLS  OLS  OLS  
        Lagged hp G/Y 
 
-0.043 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.013 
 
  
(0.04) 
 
(0.09) 
 
(0.04) 
 Election|Fix 
 
0.183*** 
 
0.130* 
 
0.099** 
 
  
(0.06) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.04) 
 Election|Else 
 
0.350** 
 
0.168*** 
 
0.144 
 
  
(0.15) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.11) 
 Election|Float 
 
0.066 
 
0.013 
 
0.021 
 
  
(0.08) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.03) 
    
 
-4.558** 
 
-1.689 
 
-9.012*** 
 
  
(1.82) 
 
(2.06) 
 
(2.81) 
 
        Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Obs 
 
2539 
 
1002 
 
569 
 Countries 
 
141 
 
68 
 
38 
 Std. Errors 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 Sample 
 
All 
 
Subsample 1 
 
Subsample 2 
 
        * 10% significance ** 5% significance *** 1% significance 
 Coeff / (Std. Error) 
       Table 4.4 
        
                                                 
5
 All regressions have been tested using the FE-estimator and the Corrected Least Square Dummy 
Variable estimator by Bruno (2005a 2005b) as well, and in no case do the results qualitatively differ 
from that of OLS. Small divergences arise when running regressions on subsamples, as only parts of 
some of the countries’ series are used. Thus, for these countries, the mean of the chosen sample may 
not be zero.  
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If proposal 2 is true, the coefficient on Election|Fix should be significantly larger than zero. 
This is also the case, as the coefficient on Election|Fix is significantly positive in all three 
samples.  
If proposal 3 is true, the coefficient on Election|Else should be greater than zero, but also 
greater than the coefficient on Election|Fix. In all three samples, the estimated coefficient is 
positive, and the estimated coefficient is also larger than the estimated coefficient on 
Election|Fix. The confidence intervals are however overlapping.  
It is interesting to note that the estimated coefficients on Election|Fix and Election|Else are 
decreasing with reduced sample size. This can be explained by that the smaller samples 
consist of fewer countries with poor institutional constraints on politicians. Thus, the budget 
cycle will be lower and in the remaining countries, and with less variation between countries.  
The estimated coefficients on the election variables are similar to those found in Brender and 
Drazen (2005). They estimate the increase in G/Y to 0.085 percentage points in election 
years in their full sample, and to 0.747 percentage points in a sample of so-called “New 
Democracies”. Shi and Svennson (2006) found that the primary surplus as a share of GDP 
was reduced by 0.69 percentage points in election years. Rerunning the regression in column 
(1) from table 4.4 using only one pooled election dummy variable, yields an estimated 
coefficient of 0.197 (results not shown). 
It is not usual in the empirical PBC literature to add more intuition on the interpretation of 
the coefficients. However, the coefficients can, ceteris paribus, be translated to the actual 
increase in spending in a given country. Using the estimated coefficient on Election|Fix in 
column (3) and the data on GDP, the estimated increase in government expenditures in an 
election year is e.g. 1.99 billion USD in Germany, and 0.13 billion USD in Ireland
6
. Note 
that these figures are obtained using the Subsample 2 results, which are in general lower 
compared to the full data set or subsample 1.  
It should be kept in mind that the results in table 4.4 are the partial derivatives with respect 
to the cyclical component of G/Y. Thus, any effect on the trend component is not included. 
                                                 
6 These numbers were calculated using 2009 figures on GDP in 2000 USD. The estimated coefficient on Election|Fix is 
simply multiplied by the value of GDP that given year. The equivalent number for Norway is 0.20 billion USD, except that 
Norway is not classified to have a fixed exchange rate for 2009.  
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If a part of the expenditure surge in an election year is permanent, the HP-filter will 
underestimate the budget cycle. This is because with permanent increases in expenditures, 
some of the increase will be captured by the trend component of the HP-filter. Hence, when 
interpreting the results from these regressions it is important to keep in mind that there could 
be traces of the political budget cycle in the trend component as well.  
It has been performed studies, as that of Hagen (2010) on a sample consisting OECD-
economies. Regressions on OECD-economies yield results that are close to a replication of 
the results from regressions on Subsample 2, and are therefore not shown.  
4.3.2 Proposition 4 - Information 
Table 4.5 shows the results from the tests of proposition 4. First of all, two countries did not 
have any observations of the Info variable, and were dropped. Secondly, there were many 
years where there were not recorded observations of the Info variable. In all, 1260 
observations were dropped due to missing observations of Info. The effect of this is in best 
case that the precision of the estimates is reduced. In worst case, it might introduce selection 
bias. Also, there is positive correlation between the interactions between the interaction 
variables and the three other election variables (the correlation coefficient is about 0.9 for all 
three pairs of election variables). This multicollinearity may lead to “unreliable estimates 
with high standard errors and of unexpected sign and magnitude” (Verbeek 2008:43) 
The signs of the coefficients are however as expected. The estimated coefficients on 
Election|Fix and Election|Else are still positive in all three subsamples. However, it is 
apparent the general level of significance has been reduced. Also, it is interesting to see that 
the estimated coefficient on Election|Float has now increased in columns (1) and (2), 
compared to the results in table 4.4. This could be explained by collinearity. Alternatively, it 
could be that there is a budget cycle in some countries with a floating exchange rate. The 
estimated coefficient on Election|Float in column (3) is still close to zero. 
The interaction variables in column (1) all have the expected signs, and are significantly 
negative in the fixed exchange rate case. The coefficient on the interaction in countries with 
a floating exchange rate is also fairly low. In columns (2) and (3) the sign varies, and none of 
the coefficients are significant. In all, proposition 4 cannot be rejected.  
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Dep. Var:  
 
hp G/Y 
 
hp G/Y 
 
hp G/Y   
Regression 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 Estimator   OLS   OLS   OLS   
        Lagged hp G/Y 
 
0.012 
 
-0.051 
 
0.013 
 
  
(0.04) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.05) 
 Election|Fix 
 
0.415*** 
 
0.462 
 
0.38 
 
  
(0.13) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.27) 
 Election|Else 
 
0.351 
 
0.115 
 
0.098 
 
  
(0.44) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.31) 
 Election|Float 
 
0.222 
 
0.743 
 
-0.043 
 
  
(0.18) 
 
(2.86) 
 
(0.07) 
 Election|Fix * Info 
 
-0.521** 
 
-0.605 
 
-0.504 
 
  
(0.21) 
 
(0.42) 
 
(0.33) 
 Election|Else * Info 
 
-0.256 
 
0.128 
 
0.056 
 
  
(0.49) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.42) 
 Election|Float * Info 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.065 
 
0.02 
 
  
(0.14) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.06) 
     
 
-4.118 
 
0.113 
 
-5.389 
 
  
(2.77) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(4.23) 
 
       
  
Year dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 Obs 
 
1279 
 
442 
 
214 
 Countries 
 
139 
 
55 
 
30 
 Std. Errors 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 Sample 
 
All 
 
Subsample 1 
 
Subsample 2 
 
        * 10% significance 
 
** 5% significance *** 1% significance 
Coeff/(Std. Error) 
       Table 4.5 
        
 
4.3.3 Proposition 5 – Corruption 
The result from the tests of proposition 5 is shown in table 4.6. Observations are dropped for 
55 countries where corruption data is not available, leaving a great potential for selection 
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bias. A further weakness is that the proxy that is used for the expected deficit in election 
years is not entirely convincing, and is also time invariant. 
 
Dep. Var:  
 
hp G/Y   hp G/Y   hp G/Y   
Regression 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 Estimator   OLS   OLS   OLS   
        Lagged hp G/Y 
 
-0.061 
 
-0.166** 
 
-0.014 
 
  
(0.07) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.04) 
 Election|Fix 
 
0.202* 
 
0.333 
 
0.293 
 
  
(0.11) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.18) 
 Election|Else 
 
0.318 
 
0.211 
 
0.535** 
 
  
(0.35) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.26) 
 Election|Float 
 
0.157 
 
0.062 
 
-0.024 
 
  
(0.24) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.12) 
 Election|Fix * Corrupt 
 
0.157 
 
0.355 
 
0.262 
 
  
(0.16) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.24) 
 Election|Else * Corrupt 
 
0.003 
 
0.055 
 
0.629* 
 
  
(0.48) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.32) 
 Election|Float * Corrupt 
 
0.11 
 
0.045 
 
-0.067 
 
  
(0.29) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.17) 
     
 
-4.992* 
 
-1.672 
 
-9.265*** 
 
  
(2.85) 
 
(2.47) 
 
(2.90) 
 
       
  
Year dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 Obs 
 
1604 
 
889 
 
565 
 Countries 
     
37 
 Std. Errors 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 Sample 
 
All 
 
Subsample 1 
 
Subsample 2 
 
        * 10% significance ** 5% significance *** 1% significance 
 Coeff/(Std. Error) 
       Table 4.6 
        
The results are in general consistent with proposition 5. First, the sign and estimated sizes of 
the election variables are similar to those found i section 4.3.1, except that the coefficient on 
Election|Float has increased somewhat in column (1). Second, all but one of the coefficients 
on the interactions between the Corruption and the election variables have the expected sign. 
Few of the variables are significant, but this is expected given the collinearity of the 
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variables. Also, the objection pointed out with reference to table 4.4 applies here: there are 
traces of a budget cycle in countries with a floating exchange rate in column (1) and (2), 
although not significantly so.  
Maintaining an exchange rate peg requires institutional discipline, as there may well be times 
when a country with a fixed exchange rate is forced to pursue monetary policies unfit for the 
domestic economy. A country with less strong institutions may choose devaluation instead 
of maintaining high interest rates in times of stress. Skånland (2004) provides anecdotal 
evidence in favour of such an interpretation, based on the experiences of Norway in the late 
1980’s and early 1990’s. So, less disciplined institutions could make it easier for an 
incumbent to undertake a manipulative fiscal policy, and countries with a fixed exchange 
rate could have stronger institutions in general compared to countries with an intermediary 
exchange rate regime. The results in table 4.6 could thus alternatively be interpreted as a test 
of institutional constraints in general. Given this interpretation, the results support the idea 
that institutional constraints in general reduce the PBC.   
4.3.4 Endogeneity  
A recurring subject in the empirical political budget cycle literature is the potential 
endogeneity of elections due to a discretionary timing schedule. Although it by and large 
have been concluded that a flexible election schedule does not have a large impact on the 
budget cycles, it should be tested whether this is the case also with this data set. In table 4.7 
all observed elections that can be sorted as being subject to either a fixed or a flexible 
schedule have been counted, and split according to the exchange rate regime. 
All observations 
 
Subsample 2 
 
Exact Inexact 
  
Exact Inexact 
Fix 26 144 
 
Fix 4 49 
Else 28 51 
 
Else 6 4 
float 23 95 
 
Float 7 37 
Table 4.7 
Note that it is far more common to have a flexible election schedule compared to a fixed. 
This has the unfortunate consequence that testing the model implications on subsample 2 
using only the exogenous elections is unlikely to yield any reliable results. Also, there are 
only four observations of elections with intermediary exchange rate regimes and flexible 
election schedule among the subsample 2 countries. In addition to the elections above, there 
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were 6 elections held in countries where the executive is not required at all to hold elections. 
These 6 elections were left out of the regressions in this section.  
First, it should be pointed out that there are in all 1933 observations of the election schedule. 
As the data set covers in all 2707 observations, there are 774 missing observations of the 
election schedule. In terms of a selection bias, a first guess would be that countries with 
missing observations are likely to have a stronger budget cycle compared to the countries 
with missing observations. However, the table below displays some details of GDP per 
capita in current USD in 2000(note that there were two countries with missing data this year) 
(Aten et al (2009)):  
GDPPC  Mean std. Dev min Max 
Schedule Observed 8572.85 9076.79 570.26 34607.52 
Schedule Missing 11224.84 14133.55 352.83 54108.91 
Table 4.8 
Table 4.8 displays that the group of countries with missing observations is fairly 
heterogeneous. So, it may not be so obvious what direction any selection bias will have.  
In order to investigate the consequences of the endogeneity regressions are run subsamples, 
shown in table 4.9 The first subsample contains observations where the election schedule is 
fixed (column 1), and the second subsample is where the schedule is flexible (column 2). At 
a second pass, only observations from subsample 2 are included, and are split in two 
subsamples in accordance with the election scheduling (columns 3 and 4).  
In the first regression including exact election schedule observations only, shown in column 
1, the coefficient estimates are quite imprecise. The estimated coefficients on both 
Election|Fix and Election|Else are as expected, but the robust standard errors are so large that 
not much interesting can be said of the true value of the coefficients. The estimated 
coefficient on Elecion|Float is even negative.  
The results from the regressions on the subsample with the inexact election schedule, shown 
in column 2 take a more familiar form. The coefficient on Election|Fix is positive and 
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significant, and the estimated coefficient on Election|Else is positive, although it has a large 
estimated standard error.  
Limiting the sample to only subsample 2 countries result in, using the subsample of a fixed 
election schedule, in a significantly negative estimated coefficient on Election|Fix. The 
estimated coefficient on Election|Else is also negative, although this is not significant.  
Dep. Var:  
 
hp G/Y   hp G/Y   hp G/Y   Hp G/Y   
Regression 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 Estimator   OLS   OLS   OLS   OLS   
          Lagged hp G/Y 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.044 
 
0.130* 
 
0.023 
 
  
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.05) 
 Election|Fix 
 
0.151 
 
0.304*** 
 
-0.313** 
 
0.155*** 
 
  
(0.12) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.03) 
 Election|Else 
 
0.166 
 
0.328 
 
-0.049 
 
0.083 
 
  
(0.14) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.17) 
 Election|Float 
 
-0.177 
 
0.136 
 
0.015 
 
0.007 
 
  
(0.23) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.03) 
     
 
-5.718 
 
-4.617* 
 
-1.247 
 
-7.427** 
 
  
(3.80) 
 
(2.42) 
 
(5.67) 
 
(3.39) 
 
          Year dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Obs 
 
415 
 
1344 
 
68 
 
328 
 Countries 
 
36 
 
107 
 
6 
 
27 
 Std. Errors 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Sample 
 
Exact 
Election 
Schedule 
 
Inexact 
Election 
Schedule 
 
Exact 
Election 
Schedule 
& 
Subsample 
2 
 
Inexact 
Election 
Schedule 
& 
Subsample 
2 
 
          * 10% significance 
 
** 5% significance *** 1% significance 
  Table 4.9 
          
There are three explanations for these strange results.
7
 The first is that there are very few 
actual observations of elections in this subsample, where e.g. the four elections observed in 
countries with a fixed exchange rate consists of three elections in Norway (1993, 1997 and 
                                                 
7 Removing the year-dummies from this regression yields similar results.  
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2001) and one in Korea (2002). The second explanation is that the HP-filter actually 
contributes to the negative estimate of the coefficients on Election|Fix and Election|Else. As 
will be shown in Appendix 10, repeating the regression on the differenced series removes the 
significance of the coefficient on Election|Fix, though it is still estimated to be negative. 
Finally, the standard errors rely on asymptotics, whereas the sample used in column 3 is 
fairly small.  
Running a regression on subsample 2 observations that have a flexible election schedule 
again produce coefficient estimates consistent with propositions 1 through 3; positive point 
estimates on the coefficients on Election|Fix and Election|Else, while the coefficient on 
Election|Float is close to zero. The coefficient on Election|Fix is significantly greater than 
zero.  
The objective of this exercise is to investigate if it matters for the political budget cycles 
whether there is a fixed or flexible election schedule. As discussed earlier, what appears to 
be the consensus is that there are no fundamental differences between the two types of 
election schedules. So far there is no reason to object to that, even though the results are not 
very convincing
8
. 
4.3.5 Dynamic structure 
Having gained some insights into the nature of political budget cycles in election years, this 
section investigates the year preceding and following an election year as well as the actual 
election year. Similar approaches have had limited success (Hagen 2010), possibly due to the 
inaccuracy associated with not taking into account the effect of different exchange rate 
regimes. In order to do this, the data set is split into two subsamples. The first of these are 
countries where the model assumptions hold. However, as there are many missing 
observations of the AFM-variable, only central bank independence is used. Section 4.3 
showed that values of CBI>0 gave results consistent with the model proposals. However, a 
regression on countries with values of CBI lower than zero still gives results qualitatively 
equal to those in section 4.3 (Not shown). Thus it seems that the model from section 3 fits all 
countries with observed values of CBI, a total of 72 countries and 1 183 observations. So, 
                                                 
8 All regressions have been re-run while omitting the output gap variable, as this variable could be endogenous and 
therefore bias the results. Omitting it could, on the other hand impose an omitted variable bias. The qualitative results 
remain unchanged to those shown in sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.3, although the general level of significance was reduced.  
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observations with observed values of CBI will be the first subgroup. The second subgroup 
will then be those observations without any observed levels of CBI. t-1 
Dep. Var:  
 
HP G/Y   HP G/Y   FD G/Y   FD G/Y 
Regression 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Estimator   OLS   OLS   OLS   OLS 
         Dep. Vart-1 
 
-0.103 
 
0.029 
 
-0.098 
 
-0.034 
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.06) 
Election|Fix t+1 
 
-0.002 
 
0.081 
 
0.169 
 
0.280** 
  
(0.10) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.14) 
Election|Fix t 
 
0.181** 
 
0.269*** 
 
0.331** 
 
0.543*** 
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.16) 
Election|Fix t-1   0.243** 
 
0.277** 
 
0.349** 
 
0.554*** 
  
(0.10) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.14) 
 
(0.16) 
Election|Else t+1 
 
-0.058 
 
-0.034 
 
0.097 
 
0.073 
  
(0.07) 
 
(0.20) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.30) 
Election|Else t 
 
0.113 
 
0.511* 
 
0.185 
 
0.693* 
  
(0.09) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.40) 
Election|Else t-1 
 
-0.015 
 
0.124 
 
0.13 
 
0.272 
  
(0.15) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.12) 
 
(0.21) 
Election|Float t+1 
 
0.07 
 
-0.121 
 
0.013 
 
-0.08 
  
(0.07) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.26) 
Election|Float t 
 
0.058 
 
0.171 
 
0.012 
 
0.143 
  
(0.06) 
 
(0.23) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.40) 
Election|Float t-1 
 
0.078 
 
0.139 
 
0.03 
 
0.115 
  
(0.06) 
 
(0.22) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.32) 
 
 
   
 
-0.889 
 
-7.206*** 
 
0.404 
 
-9.686*** 
  
(1.95) 
 
(2.35) 
 
(2.57) 
 
(3.49) 
         Year dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Obs 
 
1063 
 
1314 
 
1005 
 
1230 
Countries 
 
72 
 
93 
 
71 
 
92 
Std. Errors 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
Sample 
 
CBI observed 
 
CBI 
Unobserved 
 
CBI 
observed 
 
CBI 
Unobserved 
         * 10% 
significance 
 
** 5% 
significance 
*** 1% 
significance 
   All explanatory variables are first differenced in (3) and (4).  
    Table 4.10 
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Running a separate regression on subsample 2 yields very similar results as on subsample 1, 
except that the general magnitude of the cycle is lower. Thus, only results from the two 
subsamples of observed and unobserved CBI are shown.  
Table 4.10 shows the results from regressions on both HP-filtered and differenced series, for 
both subgroups. Future, contemporaneous and lagged election variables are included.  
The sign and significance of the contemporaneous election variables are similar to what has 
already been found, but there is clear signs of that there is more going on than what has been 
found in the election years.  
Figure 4.2 show the estimated coefficients for the HP-filtered series, and figure 4.3 the 
estimated coefficients for the FD series. The estimated effect on the dependent variable is 
measured on the vertical axis, and time is on the horizontal axis. -1 indicates the year before 
an election, 0 the actual election year, and 1 the year after an election.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: The estimated coefficients on the election variables obtained from the HP-
Filtered series. The Y-axis displays the estimated effect on the dependent variable. The X-
axis shows time, where -1 is the year before an election, 0 is the election year and 1 is the 
year after an election.  
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Figure 4.3: The estimated coefficients on the election variables obtained from the FD-series. 
See Figure 4.2 for further details.  
One distinct feature of both figures is that the Election|Float-curve is near flat, and close to 
zero. A second feature is that the Election|Fix-curves are positive before, during and after an 
election. The HP and FD results are pretty much in agreement over this, except that the FD 
results indicate stronger cycles than the HP-results. This is not surprising, as some of the 
increase in spending should be permanent and therefore be picked up by the trend 
component of the HP-filter. The Election|Else curves indicate that the increase in spending is 
decreasing the year after an election.  
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Figure 4.4: The estimated coefficients on the election variables obtained from the HP-
Filtered series. See Figure 4.2 for further details. 
 
Figure 4.5: The estimated coefficients on the election variables obtained from the FD-series. 
See Figure 4.2 for further details. 
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Figure 4.4 and 4.5 plots the estimated coefficients for the various election variables from the 
HP-filtered and FD series, respectively. Both figures essentially tell the same story, except 
that, again, the FD results lie above HP-results.  
There are a few differences compared to the countries with observed CBI. First, looking at 
the Election|Float curves, there is a trace of a budget cycle in these countries. Although it is 
not significant, this can indicate two things. First, that the model propositions are relevant for 
a larger sample of countries than only those with observed values of CBI. Second, the trace 
of the budget cycle in these countries adds to the trustworthiness of the model from section 
3. If the propositions were relevant for countries which definitely do not have an 
independent central bank, it would be unlikely that the mechanisms described by the model 
were correct.  
The patterns of the Election|Fix curves are similar to those found earlier, in that there 
appears to be an increase in spending before, during and after elections. The Election|Else 
curves appear to have a more marked peak in the actual election year, where the curve lies 
above that of Election|Fix. 
The curves where CBI is observed lie in general below those where CBI is unobserved. This 
is hardly surprising, as e.g. access to information and corruption level should be better in 
countries with observed CBI. However, the patterns of the Election|Fix and Election|Else 
curves are surprisingly similar. There appears to be more of a peak in the budget cycle in 
countries with an intermediary exchange rate regime. However, there are still signs of 
increased spending also the year after an election in these countries. The Election|Fix curves 
show sign of a persistent increase in government expenditures.  
Assumed the output gap is unaffected by increased government spending, the additive effect 
from the year before an election to the year after an election can be calculated. It is done by 
adding together the election coefficients from the FD regression, but taking into account the 
change in the lagged dependent variable. Figure 4.8 and 4.9 displays the resulting cumulative 
effects, for the CBI observed and CBI unobserved subsamples. 
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Figure 4.8: The estimated cumulative effect of elections, obtained using the FD-series. Y-
axis displays the cumulative effect on G/Y at each point in time. The X-axis displays time, 
where -1 is the year before an election, 0 is the election year and 1 is the year after an 
election. 
Both figure 4.8 and 4.9 shows that there is a near linear increase in G/Y in countries with a 
fixed exchange rate. The total effect of an election on G/Y over these three years is a net 
increase in .8 and 1.35 percentage points, respectively. The curves for countries with an 
intermediary exchange rate regime is kinked in the election year in both figures, and remain 
below that of the fixed exchange rate regimes throughout.  
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Figure 4.9: The estimated cumulative effect of elections. See figure 4.8 for details. 
This section has expanded the analysis to include the effects of elections on adjacent years. 
The main, qualitative finding is that the PBC, i.e. the increase in spending, is not restricted to 
the election year. In general there has been found that spending increases before, during and 
after elections. Propositions 1, 2 and 3 still appear to be valid as an increase in spending is 
not found in countries with a floating exchange rate. Also, there seems to be a trace of a 
budget cycles in countries with unobserved CBI and a floating exchange rate.  
It is also found that there appears to be further differences between the PBC in countries with 
different exchange rate regimes than what can be explained by propositions 1-3. These 
findings should be taken with some care as the confidence intervals are overlapping. 
However, the increase in spending appears to be more centred on the election year in 
countries with an intermediary exchange rate regime. The increase in spending appears to be 
more persistent, in particular the year after the election, in countries with a fixed exchange 
rate.  
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5. Discussion 
5.1 The model and its assumptions 
The empirical section has merely tested the proposals that were generated by the model; the 
model in itself has not been tested.  The assumption on the visibility of the interest rate is an 
innovation of this thesis that has not, to my knowledge, been explored in earlier work. It is 
also crucial for the model results. Section 3 has provided some arguments for why the 
assumption is justifiable. However, propositions similar to those found in this thesis could be 
reached without relying on the assumption of the visibility of the interest rate.  
As an example of this, assume voters vote for the incumbent if they are content and vote for 
the opponent if they are not, i.e. similar to the Nordhaus (1975) approach. The wealthier 
voters are, and the more public services they receive, the more content they are. Assume still 
that the reactions by the central bank are as described in section 3. So, in a flexible exchange 
rate regime case, an increase in government spending will be followed by an increase of the 
interest rate. The increased government spending makes voters more content. The increased 
interest rate will on the other hand have an opposite effect; it will reduce the present value of 
the future income of consumers, and will increase the present value of their debt (Of course, 
consumers could be net creditors, in that case this argument might not hold). Thus, 
consumers might even be less content after the increase in government spending. Such an 
explanation could be thought of as an updated version of the Clark and Hallerberg (2000) 
model, which utilizes slightly more realistic view on the mechanisms that govern 
macroeconomics compared to the Mundell-Fleming framework. 
Within such a framework, proposition 1 – 3 could be replicated, with a possible exception of 
that the budget cycles are larger in the case of intermediary exchange rate regimes. However, 
building a microfounded, internally consistent model with these ideas is likely to be 
challenging. Therefore, it could be argued that this explanation requires a greater leap of 
faith than accepting the assumptions from section 3.  
A second possibility could be to leave the politicians with a bit more honour. Assume 
inference through the interest rate is equally difficult as inference through inflation or 
production. Furthermore, expand the model in section 3 to include traded and non-traded 
goods, and also costs of shifting factors of production from one type of goods to the other. 
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Finally, assume politicians actually care about their policies, and possibly share the same 
utility function as consumers in addition to the rent from remaining in office. So, assume a 
country has a floating exchange rate. An expansionary fiscal policy will be followed by an 
increase of the interest rate, and the currency will appreciate. Demand for traded goods will 
decline and factors of production will shift, thereby incurring readjustment costs. With a 
fixed exchange rate on the other hand, the country will avoid these readjustment costs, 
making the cost of manipulation smaller for the politician. Thus, propositions 1 to 3 could 
possibly be reached within such a framework, although probably with an exception of the 
relative magnitude of the cycles with fixed vs intermediary exchange rate regimes. Also, the 
conclusion of that there will never be budget cycles with floating exchange rate might be too 
strong.  
It is possible that more than one of these suggested mechanisms is appropriate. As this thesis 
does not allow for picking a “winner”, it can be concluded there is great potential for 
refinement in this first attempt to create a unified, micro-founded model of political budget 
cycles and macroeconomics. However, a lesson that can be drawn from this thesis is that it is 
demanding to maintain the assumption of rational voters as the model of PBC becomes 
richer, and the assumptions may at some point seem less believable than the alternative of 
dropping the assumption of rationality. Thus, the validity of the assumption of rationality 
could well be investigated in future research.    
5.2 The propositions and the empirical results 
As for the empirical analysis, it is about time to reach a verdict; are the proposals supported 
by the data? 
5.2.1 Proposition 1, 2 and 3 – The effect of the exchange rate 
regime 
Proposition 1 definitely have support in the data. There is little or no trace of a budget cycles 
in countries with floating exchange rate regime, and in particular not in countries where the 
model assumptions a more likely to hold.   
Proposition 2 also definitely has support in the data, as a significant political budget cycle is 
found in countries with a fixed exchange rate in all subsamples.  
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However, it is not so easy to determine if proposition 3 is supported. Significant budget 
cycles were found in countries with an intermediary exchange rate regime, but it has not 
been established that the cycles are larger compared to those with a fixed exchange rate. As 
discussed in section 3, the point about the relative magnitude of the cycles may well stem 
from the simple setup of the model, and would thus disappear had the model been more 
richly specified.  
Section  4.3.5 showed that proposition 1 may not have support in regressions on countries 
with unobserved values of CBI, although it is not rejected. As the model has applicability 
only in cases where the vital assumptions of the model are met, it is noteworthy that it has 
not been found a minimum value of CBI, where the model propositions are rejected for CBI-
values below this level. It may be that none of the observations of CBI is as low is this 
minimum level. As a consequence, it could be the model setup is relevant for a larger set of 
countries than those included in the CBI-sample. This is realistic given the wide definition of 
central bank independence that was used in the model.  
5.2.2 Proposition 4 and 5 – Information and corruption 
Propositions 4 and 5 also have support in the data, although with varying significance. 
However, the tests of these propositions rest on the use of proxies. Info should be a good 
measure of access to information. There is a greater rift between the expected debt level and 
Corruption, as this variable also measures other factors that could influence on the budget 
cycles. As discussed in section 3, such factors could e.g. be pecuniary rents enjoyed by the 
incumbent, or alternatively institutional constraints on politicians in general. It is therefore 
not surprising that the test of proposition 5 yielded such strong results. Even so, as argued 
earlier, a more rich model in section 3 would probably also show how the rents associated 
with remaining in power would affect the budget cycles. It is then important to be aware of 
the fact that this thesis has tested the impact of corruption in general on the budget cycles, 
and not precisely proposition 5.  
5.2.3 The dynamics of the political budget cycles and fiscal 
sustainability 
Section 4.3.5 explores the dynamics of the PBC. The main finding is that the increase in 
spending is not restricted to the actual election year. Also, the increase in spending appears 
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to be different in countries with different exchange rate regimes, and the difference goes 
beyond what propositions 1-3 can explain.  
The findings raise some questions. First, why does spending increase both before and after 
the election? One possible reason for this could be that government spending is sluggish; 
hence it is necessary to increase spending well in advance of an election in order to have 
high spending in the actual election year. This could possibly also explain why it in some 
series is found positive expenditures in also in the year following an election. Alternatively, 
it could be that it is not controlled for the time of the year the election have taken place, nor 
is it controlled for that the fiscal year may not match the calendar year. Any of these factors 
could explain why it is observed increased spending in the years before and/or after an 
election. However, it is doubtful whether these factors can fully explain the phenomenon, as 
the budget cycles appears to be varying between the different exchange rate regimes. Thus, 
this question remains unanswered.  
A second question that is raised by the findings in section 4.3.5 is related to fiscal 
sustainability, namely how is the increase in spending financed? One possibility is that taxes 
are increased simultaneously, which implies that the increase sustainable. As this thesis does 
not investigate tax revenues, it cannot be concluded if this is the case. However, as earlier 
work has found a decline in tax revenues in election years, it is doubtful if this is the case 
(Brender and Drazen (2005)). A second possibility is that the increase in spending is 
financed through debt. However, if this is the case it is surprising that spending does not 
appear to decrease in any of the years investigated.  Thus, the increase in spending might not 
be sustainable in the long run, as debt is continually rolled over and never repaid. 
Alternatively, it could be that the decrease in spending is found in years other than those 
examined. Again, this thesis does unfortunately not allow for coming to a conclusion on this.  
5.2.4 The findings compared to previous research 
Comparing the empirical results in this paper with previous work, it is clear that taking the 
exchange rate regime into account is of great importance. Hagen (2010) tested for whether 
fiscal policies were expansionary the year before an election, and concluded that the 
expansionary fiscal policy occurs in the election year only. This thesis has shown that there 
are expansionary policies taking place before, during and after elections. Thus, taking the 
exchange rate regime into account increases the precision of estimates. Further, it is of 
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particular importance when EU-member countries are in the data set, due to the effect of the 
EMU.  
The findings in this thesis bear some resemblance to the discussion related to the 
consequences of the Euro on fiscal discipline. Hallet and Lewis (2005) studied fiscal 
discipline for the Euromembers in three periods; 1960-1991 (The pre-Maastrich phase), 
1992-1997 (Run-up to monetary union) and finally 1998-2002 (The stability-pact phase). 
The paper found that there was increased fiscal discipline in the run-up to the monetary 
union, and proposes that this can explained by the credible threat of exclusion from the 
EMU. The paper finds however that fiscal discipline deteriorates after 1998, and the authors 
conclude that that “by 2005, there is less discipline than before the Maastricht process 
started” (Hallett and Lewis 2005:17). The article proposes that the threat of imposing fines 
on members violating the Stability and Growth Pact is unsatisfactory. However, the findings 
of deteriorating fiscal discipline as the individual countries monetary authorities are 
becoming more constraint due to participation in the monetary union are indeed consistent 
with the findings of this thesis.  
 82 
6. Conclusion 
6.1 Research Question 
This thesis has aimed to answer the question “How does an independent central bank affect 
political budget cycles”. To answer this question, a model has been presented that draws on 
both political economy and New-Keynesian macroeconomics. The model produces five 
simple proposals. In short, the independent central bank can be a crucial determinant for the 
presence of political budget cycles. However, the effect depends on the exchange rate 
regime; with a floating exchange rate, there will never be budget cycles, but if there are 
limits to the allowed movement of the exchange rate there will be equilibrium budget cycles.  
The paper then proceeds to testing the model proposals, using a data set over 141 countries 
for the years 1990 to 2009. In both countries with an independent central bank and highly 
developed democracies the model proposals have great support.  
The increased precision of estimates that arises when taking into account the effect of 
different exchange rate regimes has allows for exploring the political budget cycles before 
and after the election year. This analysis has shown that political budget cycles are not 
restricted to the election year. Also, the analysis has indicated that the exchange rate regime 
matters for the dynamics of the cycles. 
6.2 Further Research 
There are a number of interesting possibilities for augmenting the model laid out in section 
3. Some of the possibilities are 
1. Allow for a semi-independent central bank, possibly similar to what was done in 
Drazen (2001b). It would then be interesting to solve the model for various exchange 
rate regimes.  
2. Explore the findings of section 4.3.5, and try to answer how increased spending both 
before and after an election can be explained.  
3. Solve the model without the restrictive assumptions of a fixed lump-sum tax and no 
risk premia in the capital market.  
 It would also be interesting to gather a better data set. In particular, more fiscal variables, 
such as tax revenue, government debt and primary surplus should be gathered.  This would 
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allow for investigating the sustainability of the PBC. Also, using quarterly data would 
possibly allow for exploring the dynamics of the budget cycles with increased precision.   
Along different lines is to investigate the benefits of central bank independence. There has 
been performed a lot of research on the effects of central bank independence, however none 
of these articles has to my knowledge included the effect of the exchange rate regime. It 
follows from this thesis that the gains from central bank independence will depend on the 
exchange rate regime; this thesis has discussed budget cycles, but there may be more to it. 
For instance, given an independent central bank, will inflation develop differently in 
countries with different exchange rate regime? And could the perspectives offered in this 
thesis explain the some of the development of public debt?  This thesis has given some 
evidence in favour of that a floating exchange rate regime will result in a more sustainable 
fiscal policy – however this could well be investigated further.  
6.3 Policy Implications 
The most fundamental lesson from this thesis is that joining a monetary union or imposing 
limits on exchange rate movements will give politicians the incentive inflate budgets in 
election years. This is most definitely a cost that needs to be considered against the pros and 
cons of various exchange rate arrangements.  
For countries that have already committed themselves to limiting the exchange rate 
movements, such as the Euro member countries, one could consider other measures to 
reduce the manipulative fiscal policies. Increased transparency of fiscal policies, “expert 
boards” approving the budget, or perhaps increased fiscal federalism in the Eurozone are 
measures that could reduce the cycles.  
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Appendix 1: List of variables and parameters used 
in section 3 
   - Public debt 
    - Voters’ estimate of public debt 
   - 
  
     
 
        
 Consumers’ consumption 
    - Aggregate foreign consumption 
    -     
   
   
 
 
 
 
   
Aggregate of goods produced abroad 
    -        
   
   
 
 
 
 
   
 Bundle of domestically produced consumption goods 
       - Good j within bundle of domestically produced consumption goods 
       - Consumption of good j in country i 
    - Bundle of goods produced within country i 
    - Consumption in country i 
    -      
   -     
   - Nominal value of consumer’s portfolio 
e - ln   
   - Upper limit of   
   - Lower limit of   
      - Home country’s public consumption of good j 
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   -       
   
   
 
 
 
 
   
 Amount of goods purchased and consumed by the public sector 
    - Public services produced 
    -       
 
 
, where           
  
  
  and i is the country identifier.  
g - -ln(1-G/Y) 
N - Labour supplied by consumers 
      - domestic labour employed by firm j 
   - Aggregate consumer price index associated with C,     
     
  
    - Aggregate consumer price index associated with    
    - domestic price index in country i, in home country’s currency 
  
   - domestic price index in country i, in country i’s currency 
  
      - Price of country i’s good j in country i’s currency 
    - World price level (both consumer and output prices) 
    -      
    -       
    -       
    -       
        - Discount factor measuring current (t) value of payoff at time t+1 
Rt   - 1/EtQt+1 
    - Aggregate foreign interest rate 
   -     
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    - Bilateral terms of trade with country i, given by           
   - Effective terms of trade, given by         
T - Lump sum taxes. Indefinitely fixed in the model.  
   - Binary variable taking a positive value if the voter calculates the current debt level, 
and zero otherwise 
W - Nominal wage charged by consumer 
   -     
    - Bilateral real exchange rate, given by           
   - Domestic production 
      - Domestic production of good j 
y - ln Y 
    -      
    - Steady state domestic output level  
   - Loss of utility if the consumer realises he has underestimated the debt level the last 
period 
    - binary variable, taking values according to political candidate in office 
     - Weight on domestically produced goods in consumption 
   - consumer’s discount factor for utility 
   - Parameter determining the weight the central bank assigns to inflation relative to 
output.  
    - Bilateral nominal exchange rate with country i 
   - Effective nominal exchange rate 
   - Upper permissible limit of  , which the central bank is instructed to maintain 
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   - Lower permissible limit of  , which the central bank is instructed to maintain 
   - elasticity of substitution between domestically produced goods  
   - elasticity of substitution between bundles of goods produced in foreign economies 
     - share of voters that do not know the contemporaneous competence level of the 
incumbent politicians (See text for further discussion) 
   - Parameter determining to what extent politicians will spend more than expected by 
voters 
   - 
             
  
 
   - Steady state markup in goods market 
    - Steady state markup in labour market 
   - Rents enjoyed by politicians from being in office one period 
   -Profit from ownership in firms 
   - Rate of inflation in   
    - Rate of inflation in    
    - Competence shock to candidate j 
   - labour supply parameter 
    - Probability of firm not being able to adjust prices each period 
    - Consumer k’s preference parameter over political candidates 
   - Log of effective real exchange rate, ln X 
    - Competence level of candidate j 
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Appendix 2: The consumers’ budget constraint 
Following Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005), price indices are given by 
          
   
 
 
   
 
   
       
          
   
 
 
   
 
   
       
Moreover:  
                  
 
 
       
                  
 
 
       
Optimisation of consumption across imported goods gives 
    
  
  
 
  
         
Foreign prices are defined as  
       
     
 
 
 
 
   
       
Equations (A2.5) and (A2.6) imply that 
            
 
 
       
Optimisation of consumption between foreign and domestically produced goods gives: 
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Thus, the consumer’s budget constraint can be rewritten to 
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Appendix 3: Prices and exchange rates 
 
Bilateral terms of trade is given by: 
   
  
  
       
Effective terms of trade is given by: 
  
  
  
            
 
 
         
As P=  
     
 , (A3.2) can be rewritten to 
             
Or alternatively in logs, where s= pF-pH: 
                          
First differencing (A3.4) gives domestic CPI: 
                    
Assuming law of one price holds for all individual goods at all times, the following must 
hold: 
          
           
Here   
     is the price of country i’s good j expressed in terms of of country i’s currency. 
Aggregating (A3.6) across all goods gives: 
         
         
 
 
 
 
   
     
        
Recalling the price index of imported goods defined in appendix 2 , and inserting from (16): 
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(A3.8) can be log-linearized to: 
          
    
 
 
            
Here e is the log of the nominal effective exchange rate,   
  if the logged price index of 
country I, and    is the world price index.  
The effective terms of trade given in (A3.2) can now be used together with (A3.9) to be 
rewritten in log-form:  
           
            
The bilateral real exchange rate is defined as: 
   
    
 
        
Taking logs of (A3.11), integrating over all countries and inserting from (20) and (14) gives:  
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Appendix 4: The IS-Curve 
Goods market clearing requires that for each good, the following must hold: 
              
           
 
 
       
I.e. that production of good j,     , equals the sum of domestic consumption of the good 
     , the sum of foreign consumers’ demand for the good    
      
 
 
, and the domestic 
government’s demand for the good       
Following Leith and Wren-Lewis (2005), symmetrical preferences abroad implies that:  
  
       
     
  
 
  
 
  
    
 
  
         
Here     is aggregate consumer consumption in country i. Substituting in (A4.1) from (A4.2) 
gives: 
      
     
  
 
  
       
  
  
    
   
   
  
 
 
            
Aggregate output is defined as  
        
   
   
 
 
 
 
   
       
 (A4.4) can be rewritten to:  
       
  
  
   
   
   
  
  
 
 
               
   
 
 
    
 
 
   
             
Defining g=-ln(1-G/Y), taking logs of (A4.5) gives: 
               
As (A4.6) holds for all countries, world output is given by 
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Above, the fact that the all effective exchange rates sum to zero is used.  
Solving (A4.7) for c, and inserting for ct and ct+1 in (6) gives: 
                                            
Here it is used that the expected change in effective terms of trade is zero. 
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Appendix 5: The Philips-Curve 
From (33) in Leith & Wren-Lewis (2005), if all wages are renegotiated each period the 
following must hold: 
 
 
    
         
Log-linearising and inserting for c in (A5.1)gives: 
                                            
Thus, the Philips Curve (3.12) can be rewritten to: 
                                                  
Recall that         and n = y, (A5.3)  can then be simplified to: 
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Appendix 6: The central bank’s response 
The loss function the central bank wishes to minimize is the squared deviations from the 
target levels for inflation and production. Note that the loss function contains domestic 
inflation instead of CPI, as if it were to contain CPI the central bank would also have to 
respond to exchange rate changes. Therefore, to make a purebred “floating exchange rate 
case” the solution adopted in this thesis is use domestic inflation. Moreover, the problem 
will be solved for a discretionary monetary policy, taking expectations for the next period as 
given.   
The complete optimization problem has the following form:  
 
             
  
 
 
    
  
 
 
        
 
   
       
Subject to: 
                                            
                                          
            
            
(A6.2) and (A6.3) are the supply and demand equations, which are standard side constraints. 
(A6.4) and (A6.5) are the constraints that govern the exchange rate.    is the nominal 
exchange rate at time t, and   and   are the lower and upper nominal exchange rate limit. 
Thus, the requirement of (A6.4) and (A6.5) is that the nominal exchange rate must stay in 
between the nominal limits.  
So, the central banks optimization problem can be formulated as follows:  
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One way to solve the problem is to differentiate (A6.6) and then write out all Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions. Fortunately, that is not necessary. The interest of this appendix is to solve the 
problem for the corner solution of floating exchange rates. In that case, (A6.4) and (A6.5) 
will neither be binding. Thus,        . The remaining Kuhn-Tucker conditions are given 
by the following (which are simply “ordinary” first order conditions, abstracting from the 
exchange rate constraints):  
    
   
              
    
   
       
                       
    
     
                  
Using the focs an expression can be obtained for the desired tradeoff between inflation and  
     
        
      
         
Inserting for production and inflation in the expression above, the central bank’s reaction 
curve can be developed:  
   
      
          
                       
             
 
                         
         
                        
    
          
          
          
(A6.11) can be more generally by written as  
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I.e. the interest rate can be expressed as a function of government spending in this period and 
the expectations of the next period.  
The interesting bit is to note that: 
   
   
 
 
     
 
          
          
            
This implies that the central bank will increase the interest rate in response to increased 
government spending. Note that (A6.13) assumes the expectations of next periods variables 
are fixed, i.e. that neither of them will change in response to increased government spending 
this period.  Section 3 discusses this assumption further.  
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Appendix 7: Data Set and Variables 
A7.1 FX-regime 
To identify the type of exchange rate regime in a country, a three-way classification system 
was used that corresponds to the one found in Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005b). 
Classification systems of greater detail were not used, as this thesis intends to run 
regressions on smaller subsamples. This limits the number of parameters that can be 
estimated with precision, as there will then be relatively few observed elections for each 
observed exchange rate regime. The variable FX3 can take on three possible values:  
1.  if a country has a floating exchange rate a given year 
2.  if a country has an intermediary exchange rate regime 
3.  if a country has a fixed exchange rate.  
For observations up to and including 2004, the source is Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2005b). The classification are based on de-facto exchange rate regimes, as opposed to de 
jure regimes, and is calculated on the basis of data on exchange rates and international 
reserves. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005a) provides a thorough discussion of the 
methodology used to classify the exchange rate regimes.  
For classifications after 2004 the source is IMF. IMF provides de facto classifications up to 
and including 2008. The classification system used by IMF is far more detailed compared to 
the simple three-way classification. However, splicing the two series is probably not very 
controversial, as the definitions used by the IMF fits well within the three-way classification. 
The following IMF-categories were classified as having a fixed exchange rate: 
 Exchange arrangement with no separate legal tender  
 Currency board arrangement  
 Other conventional fixed peg arrangement  
 Eurocountries 
The following IMF-categories were assigned as having an intermediary exchange rate:  
 Pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands 
 Crawling peg 
 Crawling band 
 Managed floating with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate 
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Finally, observations in the IMF-category “independently floating” were naturally classified 
as having a floating exchange rate. Classifications are used without any adjustments except 
the 2008 observation for Guinea, which is classified as having a fixed exchange rate as the 
country is a member of the West African Monetary Union (IMF (2011)). Also, the 2008 
observation for Bolivia was assigned to the intermediary category, as the country was listed 
in several of the categories. For 2005 there were several classifications available, but as 
annual observations are needed only, the observations labelled “July 2005” were not used.    
Unfortunately, the data set over exchange rate regimes consist of some gaps. Some 
individual observations from the three-way classification are missing from the Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger dataset, although some of them are given the value of “inconclusive” in 
their five-way classification system. Also, IMF has not published any classifications for 
2007. However: taking into account that there must be some stability to the game between 
politicians and the central bank, the gaps of some of the missing observations were filled in, 
using the following methodology: If for a given country there are observations the year 
before and after a missing observation, and these observations both are classified with the 
same exchange rate regime, the gap is filled with the same classification as that before and 
after the gap. In all 112 observations were filled in using this methodology.  
A7.2 CBI – Central Bank Independence 
In order to control for that the assumption of having an independent central bank is fulfilled 
data from Crowe and Meade (2007) is used. This data set actually consists of two merged 
dataset, the first of which was presented in Cukierman, Nebb and Neyapti (1992). This was a 
study of central bank independence which was based on a sample over the years 1980-1989. 
Crowe and Meade (2007) repeated the study using a sample from 2003, and this paper also 
provides a thorough discussion of the measures that are used. The variable in question, 
CWN, varies from zero to one where a higher number indicates higher central bank 
independence. However, as the aforementioned is a measure of de jure central bank 
independence, Cukierman, Nebb and Neyapti (1992) find that the turnover rate of central 
bank governors per year, TI, works better as a proxy for de facto central bank independence 
in developing countries compared to the de jure measure.  
Lacking anything that appears to be a very good measure of central bank independence, a 
new variable is constructed: CBI_two_obs=CWN-TI. However, there is the problem that 
 106 
there at most are only two observations of this variable per country: CWN is based on first a 
1989-1990 sample, and thereafter a 2003 sample. The turnover data is based on data from a 
1989-1990 sample and a sample from 1995 to 2004. Acimoglu et al (2008) assigns dates to 
major central bank reforms in various countries. So, a new variable is generated, CBI:  
 For a given country, the observation from 1990 and up to the year of major 
central bank reform, each year the country is given the value of 1990 
observation of CBI_two_obs 
 From the year of major reform and onwards, the 2003 observation of 
CBI_two_obs is used 
 If Acemoglu (2008) does not provide a shift year, 2003 used as the year of 
major reform 
Exceptions to this rule were Brazil (2000), Chile (1990), Australia (1996) and New Zealand 
(1990). To these exceptions the year of major reform was set to the year in parenthesis, 
based on the discussion in Acemoglu (2008). Another exception was Macedonia, which was 
classified as having all of its values of CBI as missing due to as the country was neither in 
the Cukierman, Nebb and Neyapti sample and was not included in the Acemoglu (2008) 
discussion. 
A7.3 Info 
In order to control for the impact of the availability of information on PBC, the methodology 
from Shi and Svennson (2006) is followed, where it is the joint effect of availability of 
information and free media that is used as a proxy for the share of informed voters. The 
variable freedom_house is collected from the Freedom House organisation, which measures 
press freedom and can vary from 0 to 100 where a lower value indicate a more free press. 
Also, the variable radios_per1000 was gathered from the International Telecommunication 
Union, measuring radio sets per 1000 inhabitants. This variable was unfortunately only 
available for the years up to 2006, and there were many missing values.   
So, a new variable is generated, info, which was calculated as info = 
radios_per1000/1000*((100-freedom_house)/100). Thus, an increased value of info implies 
greater availability of information.  
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A7.4 AFM – Access to Financial Markets 
Data is gathered from the Financial Access Survey administered by the IMF  - Financial 
Access Survey. As the dataset contains many missing values, the following variables: 
 Overall Borrowers per 1000 adults  
 Borrowers from commercial banks per 1000 adults  
 Borrowers from other depository corporations per 1000 adults  
 Depositors with commercial banks per 1000 adults  
 Depositors with other depository corporations per 1000 adults  
 Depositors/Clients per 1000 adults 
Thereafter a new variable is generated, AFM, which is calculated as the average of all six 
variables above each year for each country.  
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Appendix 8: Unit roots and stationarity 
The only variable of concern with respect to unit roots is the dependent variable, G/Y. As 
discussed in the main text, it is not straightforward to test for unit roots with panel data. 
If it is assumed that all countries share the same autocorrelation coefficient, the Durbin-
Watson based test proposed in Bhargava et al (1982) can be used. This test can unfortunately 
only be used on static models, and test the properties of the residuals from a WG-estimator. 
They tabulate critical values that allows for testing both the null of serial correlation as well 
as the null of a unit root.  
Estimating (4.1) with an FE estimator, and omitting the lagged dependent variable, produces 
a panel Durbin-Watson statistic of 0.586
9
. Bhargava et al (1982) only tabulates critical 
values of up to T=10, however it seems clear that the null of a unit root should not be 
rejected (Critical lower value for the DW-statistic when testing the null of a unit root is with 
N=150, T=10 and 15 explanatory variables is 0.93). Repeating the procedure, but by first 
differencing (4.1), yields a DW-statistic of 1.957. This is so high that even the null of 
positive serial correlation can be rejected (Upper critical DW-stat for testing for positive 
serial correlation with N=150, T=10 and 15 explanatory variables is 1.9375), although T is 
somewhat larger and there are more explanatory variables than 15.  
However, it is possible that the countries have different levels of serial correlation. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are therefore run on all time series. The Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test estimates the following equation (country denominators are dropped to simplify 
notation): 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
   
     
 
 
 
   
      
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
     
  
 
   
          
The null hypothesis of the test is that the G/Y has a unit root, i.e. that    . (A8.1) could 
also be modified to include a trend. In order to remove serial correlation from the error term, 
further lags of the differenced G/Y are included up to lag p. In order to determine p, the 
sequential T test proposed by Ng and Perron (1994), by first running estimating (A8.1) using 
                                                 
9 The Panel Durbin-Watson statistic was calculated using the xtdw-command implemented in Stata by Nunziata (2002) 
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p=int[12(T+1)/100)^.25 ] as proposed by Schwert(1989), and then removing one lag if the p-
value of the coefficient of p is greater than 0.1. The procedure then continues until the 
coefficient of the greatest lag is larger than 0.1, or all lags are removed. A discussion of the 
procedure is found in the Stata User Guide (2009) 
The table below displays the results. For over two thirds of the individual series the null of a 
unit root cannot be rejected at the 10% level, regardless of whether a trend is included or not.   
Results ADF on G/Y Trend w/o Trend 
Reject at 10% 32 35 
Reject at 5% 27 25 
Reject at 1% 18 20 
Total number of series 141 141 
Table A8.1 
  Thus, it seems that the potential problems with unit roots should be taken seriously.  
It might be that the series G/Y is non-stationary for some of the series. Another alternative is 
that it in fact is stationary, but that the ADF-test does not have sufficient power to reject the 
null of a unit root; recall that there are on average only about 18 observations for each of the 
series.  
ADF tests are run on all the first differenced series of G/Y, without a trend. The results are 
given in the table below:  
Results: ADF on FD G/Y 
 Reject at 10% 116 
Reject at 5% 103 
Reject at 1% 80 
Total Number of Series 140 
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Table A8.2 
 The number of rejections is greatly improved, although there are 24 series where the null of 
a unit root cannot be rejected at 10% significance level (one of the series was dropped 
because it because it became too short after first differencing). As a reference, the results 
from a similar ADF test on the HP-filtered series G/Y is given in table A8.3:  
Results ADF on HP G/Y 
 Reject at 10% 131 
Reject at 5% 126 
Reject at 1% 102 
Total number of series 141 
Table A8.3 
 
  The series HP G/Y is stationary, however there are still 10 series where the ADF-test does 
not manage to reject the null of a unit root. Although this is not a formal test, and the ADF 
test statistics may be biased due to the high order serial correlation of the series HP G/Y, the 
similarities between the results from the ADF tests on HP G/Y and FD G/Y are indicative of 
that first differencing the series G/Y renders the series stationary.  
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Appendix 9: Hodrick-Prescott filter 
There are several possible strategies in order to ensure a series is stationary. One of them is 
to apply a filter, as the one proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1981). The HP-filter sees each 
time series as the sum of two components; one cyclical component and one growth 
component. The filter is based on the assumption that the growth component is fairly smooth 
over time. The modest requirement to the cyclical component is that its average should be 
close to zero over time. To calculate the two components of the filter, the procedure is to 
choose values for all growth components that minimise the following equation: 
   
  
  
 
 
 
    
  
   
                            
 
 
   
        
Here  
 
 
 
    
 is the cyclical component, g is the growth component, and the sum of these is 
the actual observation.     is a key parameter in this context; it  determines the “cost” of 
changing the direction of the trend. If     is set sufficiently high, the filter will merely 
produce a linear time trend.  
A rather important question to answer is if the conceptual framework that the HP-filter rests 
on fits the purposes in this paper. There are clearly some long-term trends that affect 
government consumption as a percentage of GDP. For instance, in developed countries the 
Thatcherism of the 1980’s should lead to a decrease in G/Y. A developing country should 
perhaps exhibit an increasing level of G/Y as the country is becoming industrialized. These 
are examples of trends that affect G/Y and that last for several years. The cyclical component 
on the other hand will be subject to shocks that affect both government consumption and 
production. Among these high-frequency movements are the phenomenon of my interest, 
namely those movements that are caused by sudden changes in government expenditure. 
Therefore, the conceptual framework of the HP-filter fits the purposes of this thesis very 
well.  
However, Hodrick and Prescott (1981) demonstrate that the serial correlation properties of 
the series change, and in their case a rather informal approach demonstrates autocorrelation 
of order one to order ten. As the HP-filter has been in use for quite some time there are well 
established parameter values for various series. For annual series the standard approach, 
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which is used throughout in this thesis, is to set           This value is based on some 
assumptions that hardly can  be imagined to hold, but is nevertheless the standard value 
when applying the HP-filter.   
King and Rebelo (1993) discuss the consequences of HP-filtering. Among these were that 
the cyclical component will have a lower variance compared to the original series, but also 
that the correlation between different series might change when the filter is applied. This 
second point calls for caution when interpreting the results, as there is a possibility that 
findings could be generated by the filter itself. However, King and Rebelo (1993) also show 
that he cyclical component has the appealing property that it is stationary, even if the original 
series is integrated of order one or higher.  
Cogley and Nason (1995) show that the HP-filter is applied to persistent series, it might even 
generate cycles that are not present in the underlying data. This is thus a piece of critique that 
should be taken into account when working with the filtered series.  
As a final note, the HP-filter is known to impose an end point bias to the series. Again, it 
should therefore be controlled for that the results are not driven by the filter itself.  
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Appendix 10: Robustness Test 
As discussed in section 4.2, there is a possibility that results are driven by the HP-filter. 
Appendix 8 provides some evidence that the first differences series of G/Y does not have a 
unit root, so this section proceeds by using this differenced series. This approach also has the 
benefit of that it will provide coefficient estimates that can be easily interpreted. With 
filtered series, the coefficients translate to the effect on the cyclical component of the series. 
With differenced series the coefficients can be interpreted as the estimated effect of elections 
on G/Y.  
Proposition 1, 2 and 3 – The effect of the exchange rate regime 
Splitting up the election variable in three according to the type of exchange rate regime 
results in estimates very similar to those found in section 4.3.1. Quantitatively, the only 
noteworthy difference is that the estimated coefficient on Election|Fix is smaller and 
insignificant in all columns (2) and (2). The coefficient on Election|Float is near zero and 
insignificant throughout.  
Dep. Var:  
 
FD G/Y 
 
FD G/Y 
 
FD G/Y   
Regression 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 Estimator   OLS   OLS   OLS   
        L. FD G/Y 
 
-0.064 
 
0.013 
 
0.041 
 
  
(0.05) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.05) 
 FD Election|Fix 
 
0.084 
 
0.048 
 
0.087* 
 
  
(0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.05) 
 FD Election|Else 
 
0.373** 
 
0.206*** 
 
0.094 
 
  
(0.17) 
 
(0.07) 
 
(0.13) 
 FD Election|Float 
 
0.046 
 
-0.026 
 
0.03 
 
  
(0.08) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.04) 
 FD    
 
-6.674*** 
 
-1.969 
 
-10.068*** 
 
  
(2.47) 
 
(2.48) 
 
(3.28) 
 
        Year dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Obs 
 
2396 
 
955 
 
545 
 Countries 
 
141 
 
67 
 
38 
 Std. Errors 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 Sample 
 All  
Subsample 1 
 
Subsample 2 
 
        * 10% significance ** 5% significance *** 1% significance 
 
Coeff / (Std.Error) 
Table A10.1 
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Proposition 4 - Information 
Table A10.2 shows the test of proposition 4. (1) is obtained using the entire data set, and the 
results are in line with what is found earlier: Proposition 4 cannot be rejected, although there 
is trace of a budget cycle in countries with a floating exchange rate. (2) and (3), which is 
based on subsamples 1 and 2 respectively, show similar results although the estimated 
coefficient on Election|Float is smaller than in (1). The results are in general insignificant 
which is not surprising given the low number of observations. The significance of the 
estimated coefficients hardly changes when using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors, 
as opposed to cluster robust errors (not shown).  
Dep. Var:  
 
FD G/Y   FD G/Y   FD G/Y   
Regression 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 Estimator   OLS   OLS   OLS   
        L. FD G/Y 
 
-0.031 
 
0.018 
 
0.141* 
 
  
(0.05) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.07) 
 FD Election|Fix 
 
0.224 
 
0.323 
 
0.32 
 
  
(0.17) 
 
(0.25) 
 
(0.29) 
 FD Election|Else 
 
0.465 
 
0.156 
 
0.297 
 
  
(0.62) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.18) 
 FD Election|Float 
 
0.229 
 
-0.177 
 
0.01 
 
  
(0.22) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.21) 
 FD Election|Fix * Info -0.36 
 
-0.56 
 
-0.48 
 
  
(0.27) 
 
(0.41) 
 
(0.36) 
 FD Election|Else * Info -0.728 
 
-0.187 
 
-0.597** 
 
  
(0.80) 
 
(0.33) 
 
(0.25) 
 FD Election|Float * Info -0.078 
 
0.155 
 
-0.022 
 
  
(0.19) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.18) 
 FD    
 
-7.496* 
 
1.918 
 
-3.802 
 
  
(4.38) 
 
(4.81) 
 
(4.74) 
 
        Year dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Obs 
 
1102 
 
375 
 
181 
 Countries 
 
139 
 
53 
 
29 
 Std. Errors 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 Sample 
 
All 
 
Subsample 1 
 
Subsample 2 
 
        * 10% significance ** 5% significance *** 1% significance 
 
Coeff. / (Std. Error) 
Table A10.2 
       . 
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All but one of the coefficients interactions between the election dummies and Info have the 
expected sign, but only one of the estimated coefficients is significantly less than zero.  
Proposition 5 – Corruption  
Table A10.3 shows the results of the test of proposition 5, along similar lines as in table 
A10.2 The results are in very similar to those found in section 4.3.3, and in none of the 
samples can proposition 5 be rejected. All of the estimated coefficients on the election 
variables and the interaction have the expected signs. The exception is the coefficients 
associated with a floating exchange rate regime, which in general are small and insignificant.  
Dep. Var:  
 
FD G/Y 
 
FD G/Y 
 
FD G/Y   
Regression 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 Estimator   OLS   OLS   OLS   
        L. FD G/Y 
 
-0.085 
 
-0.037 
 
0.043 
 
  
(0.07) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.05) 
 FD Election|Fix 
 
0.137 
 
0.175 
 
0.460** 
 
  
(0.11) 
 
(0.19) 
 
(0.22) 
 FD Election|Else 
 
0.536 
 
0.374*** 
 
0.544 
 
  
(0.39) 
 
(0.13) 
 
(0.39) 
 FD Election|Float 
 
0.106 
 
-0.055 
 
0.017 
 
  
(0.24) 
 
(0.18) 
 
(0.20) 
 FD Election|Fix * Corrupt 
 
0.172 
 
0.228 
 
0.500* 
 
  
(0.17) 
 
(0.28) 
 
(0.30) 
 FD Election|Else * Corrupt 
 
0.407 
 
0.333 
 
0.743 
 
  
(0.56) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.46) 
 FD Election|Float * Corrupt 
 
0.055 
 
-0.078 
 
-0.021 
 
  
(0.32) 
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.26) 
 FD    
 
-7.152 
 
-2.972 
 
-10.423*** 
 
  
(4.47) 
 
(2.96) 
 
(3.37) 
 
        Year dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Obs 
 
1517 
 
848 
 
541 
 Countries 
 
86 
 
59 
 
37 
 Std. Errors 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 Sample 
 
All 
 
Subsample 1 
 
Subsample 2 
 
        * 10% significance ** 5% significance *** 1% significance 
 
Coeff. / (Std. Error) 
Table A10.3 
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Endogeneity 
Table A10.4 displays the results from tests of propositions 1 through 3, when splitting the 
sample in countries with a fixed and flexible election schedule. (1) and (2) the subsamples 
are chosen from the entire data set, whereas (3) and (4) uses subsample 2 observations only. 
The results are qualitatively very similar to those found earlier, with a possible exception of 
that the negative coefficient on Election|Fix in column (3) not significant.     
Dep. Var:  
 
FD G/Y 
 
FD G/Y 
 
FD G/Y 
 
FD G/Y 
Regression 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
Estimator   OLS   OLS   OLS   OLS 
         L. FD G/Y 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.063 
 
0.102 
 
0.075 
  
(0.10) 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.08) 
FD Election|Fix 
 
0.193 
 
0.140* 
 
-0.176 
 
0.111** 
  
(0.15) 
 
(0.08) 
 
(0.16) 
 
(0.04) 
FD Election|Else 
 
0.063 
 
0.476 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.136 
  
(0.12) 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.11) 
 
(0.22) 
FD Election|Float 
 
-0.278 
 
0.149 
 
0.069 
 
0.017 
  
(0.24) 
 
(0.10) 
 
(0.15) 
 
(0.05) 
FD       -7.752* 
 
-6.047* 
 
-2.321 
 
-10.226* 
  
(4.22) 
 
(3.63) 
 
(6.72) 
 
(5.20) 
       
    
Year dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes 
 
Yes 
Obs 
 
396 
 
1252 
 
65 
 
309 
Countries 
 
35 
 
104 
 
6 
 
27 
Std. Errors 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
 
Cluster R 
Sample 
 
Exact Election 
Schedule  
Inexact 
Election 
Schedule 
 
Subsample 2 
& Exact 
Election 
Schedule 
 
Subsample 2 
& Inxact 
Election 
Schedule 
* 10% 
significance ** 5% significance *** 1% significance Coeff / (Std. Error) 
  Table A10.3 
         
Although only results from FD-OLS and the results from regressions on the HP-filtered 
series are reported in this thesis, many other estimators have been tested. These trials 
included using a more sophisticated filter by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003), and various 
estimators which assumes that G/Y is stationary (or alternatively, that     
    
    
    
  is 
stationary). Also, instrumenting the lagged dependent variable of FD-OLS have been tried 
through various estimators (Anderson-Hsiao (1982) and Arellano-Bond (1991)). None of 
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these approaches add anything to the analysis, as the results in general are the same as what 
has been shown so far. Thus, no further robustness tests are included in this thesis. 
Based on the results in this appendix, it can be concluded that the results that were found in 
section 4.3.1 to 4.3.4 were not at all driven by the HP-filter.  
 
